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I	  
ABSTRACT 
A recent Norwegian legislative proposal, likely to become law in 2014, suggests that hedge 
funds should be able to approach non-professional, private investors. In light of this, the 
objective of our thesis is to examine if hedge funds are an attractive investment opportunity 
for a Norwegian private investor. By defining two sub-questions, we use empirical research 
and relevant academic literature to study several aspects of hedge funds. Based on the Sharpe 
ratio and the Modified Sharpe ratio, we find support for hedge funds providing an attractive 
risk/reward relationship. However, these performance evaluations are insufficient due to the 
illiquidity of hedge funds, the leverage risks, and the returns biases. As the efficient frontiers 
of stocks and bonds improve when hedge funds are included, one can argue that hedge funds 
provide unique returns. However, the non-normality, skewness, and kurtosis may distort the 
efficient frontiers. In addition, the calculated correlations between hedge funds and traditional 
assets, as well as the similarities between the payoff structure of hedge funds and short put 
options, indicate that hedge funds are not providing unique exposure. In total, our 
recommendation for Norwegian private investors is to be cautious with regards to investing 
in hedge funds. This is due to the fact that the performance of hedge funds may be distorted, 
the risk management features may be lower than expected, and hedge funds will likely be an 
expensive way of obtaining an unattractive payoff structure. 
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This thesis completes our Double Degree of Master of Science in Financial Economics from 
the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) and Master of Science in Management from 
Louvain School of Management (LSM). 
 
The topic chosen for this thesis was hedge funds. The hedge fund industry has grown 
tremendously the last decades, and the legal environment in Norway regarding hedge funds is 
evolving. The common perception of high returns and managers receiving extreme payoffs 
intrigued us. With an expected liberalisation of hedge fund regulations in Norway, our topic 
for this thesis is as relevant as ever.  
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is written in light of the expected liberalisation of hedge fund regulation in 
Norway, allowing hedge funds to market themselves directly to non-professional investors. 
We are analysing from a Norwegian private investor’s point of view, where the private 
investor is defined as a risk-averse and non-professional investor. The time period for this 
analysis is from the beginning of January 2004 to the end of December 2013. Using historical 
returns as a proxy for expected returns in our research, the findings will give an indication of 
how hedge funds could perform in the future. The objective of this thesis is to examine the 
research question:  
Are hedge funds an attractive investment opportunity for a Norwegian private 
investor? 
 
To examine our research question, we have developed two sub-questions. In sub-question I, 
we look into the following:  
Do hedge funds provide an attractive risk/reward relationship for a private investor? 
 
To analyse sub-question I, we explore three aspects regarding the risk/reward relationship of 
hedge funds. The first aspect is the Sharpe ratio, making it possible to rank standalone 
investment opportunities. The second aspect is to calculate key statistics, providing insight 
regarding the normality, skewness, and kurtosis of hedge fund returns. These statistical 
properties will be used to discuss the relevance of the mean-variance framework. The third 
and final aspect is to consider the criticism of the mean-variance framework by adjusting the 
risk measure. To incorporate the adjusted risk measure, we will use the Modified Sharpe ratio 
instead of the traditional Sharpe ratio to rank the different standalone investments. 
 
In sub-question II, we look into the following: 
Are hedge funds providing a unique exposure compared to other asset classes for a 
private investor?  
 
To analyse sub-question II, we explore three aspects regarding the unique exposure of hedge 
funds. The first aspect explores if hedge funds provide returns that are uncorrelated from 
other assets, hence attractive in terms of risk management and justifying the substantial fees 
demanded by hedge funds managers. The second aspect involves calculating efficient 
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frontiers for an investment universe consisting of stocks and bonds, both with and without the 
possibility of investing in hedge funds. The efficient frontiers provide insight regarding the 
risk management opportunities and justification of hedge funds’ use of fees. The third aspect 
investigates the similarity between the payoff structures of hedge funds and short put options. 
This will provide us with insight regarding the cost, and the attractiveness of the hedge funds 
return structure for a private investor. 
 
By elaborating on the two sub-questions, we will be able to analyse if hedge funds are an 
attractive investment opportunity for a Norwegian private investor. Hedge funds have been 
analysed in several research papers, and some of the research papers will be presented in this 
thesis. The mission of our thesis is to add to the research conducted on hedge funds by using 
Nordic hedge fund data, and by scoping the thesis directly towards a private investor.  
 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
In chapter 2-7, we elaborate on theoretical aspects related to this thesis. Chapter 2 introduces 
hedge funds. In chapter 3, we look into the statistical properties of hedge fund returns. 
Chapter 4 explains modern portfolio theory, while chapter 5 elaborates on risk-adjusted 
performance measures. In chapter 6, we present nine common hedge fund strategies that will 
be used in the empirical research. The last chapter in the theoretical part of this thesis is 
chapter 7, presenting the different biases inherent in hedge fund returns data.  
 
In chapter 8, the description of the data that will be used in the empirical research is 
presented. Chapter 9 consists of the findings and discussion of the findings with regards to 
sub-question I: The Risk/Reward Relationship of Hedge Funds. Chapter 10 consists of the 
findings and discussion of the findings with regards to sub-question II: The Uniqueness of 
Hedge Fund Returns. 
 
Chapter 11 provides limitations and suggestions for further research with regards to the 
empirical research. In Chapter 12, the final chapter, we present our conclusion. After the 
conclusion, an appendix is included for more detailed elaborations and illustrations of the 
findings. 
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2.0 THE WORLD OF HEDGE FUNDS 
This chapter introduces the concept of hedge funds. In the first section, we look into the 
history of hedge funds. The second section elaborates on the different characteristics of hedge 
funds, while the third section explains different ways of accessing hedge funds. In the fourth 
and final section, we elaborate on the Norwegian hedge fund market.  
 
2.1 History 
“Any idiot can make a big return by taking a big risk. You just buy the S&P, you 
lever up – there’s nothing clever about that. What`s clever is to have a return that is 
risk-adjusted.” (Mallaby, 2010) 
 
The beginning of the hedge fund industry is often dated to 1949, widely acknowledged as the 
year Alfred Winslow Jones set up the first modern hedge fund1. However, according to 
Lhabitant (2006), the first techniques of a modern hedge fund should be credited Karl 
Karsten. In his work, Karsten presented the “hedge principle”: if one expects that some 
stocks, for example motor stocks, on average will outperform the equity market, then one 
should buy motor stocks and sell short an equally large amount in dollar value of the market 
(Lhabitant, 1996).  In December 1930, the Karsten Statistical Laboratory started a small fund 
to test Karsten’s research. By June 1931 the fund was up 78%. As Karsten’s objective was 
mainly to justify his theories, and not to earn profits, it still remains a mystery for how long 
the fund lasted. Opposed to Karsten, Alfred Winslow Jones created a private investment 
partnership solely to earn money, making him the first hedge fund manager (Lhabitant, 
1996). 
 
Similar to Karsten, Jones did not primarily have a financial background as he studied 
sociology, but he became familiar with finance when he worked for Fortune Magazine during 
the start of the 1940s. By 1948, Jones had left Fortune and started working on an article as a 
freelancer, titled “Fashions in Forecasting”. The article was about exploring different 
techniques for market timing, and the research gave Jones the idea to start investing himself 
(Brown & Christy, 2001). According to Mallaby (2010), Jones’ hedge fund followed four 
main principles.  The first principle was the use of a performance fee. Jones kept 20 % of the 
investment gains from the fund for himself and his team, a measure to sharpen the incentives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The A.W Jones hedge fund is still active today. 
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of investment managers. Secondly, Jones was eager to avoid regulation, and he deliberately 
did not advertise the fund to the public in general. This way the fund could invest in any asset 
class and use any technique that they felt best suited the market situation at any time. The 
third principle was that Jones balanced his long positions in promising shares, and combined 
this with short positions in unpromising shares. By doing this correctly, the portfolio would 
presumably reduce its exposure to general market swings. The final principle was the use of 
leverage. By reducing the market risk, Jones had the possibility to increase stock specific risk 
by leveraging his positions. 
 
Throughout the 1960s, hedge funds gained recognition as they delivered huge returns.  In 
1966, a Fortune Magazine article titled “The Jones nobody keeps up with” highlighted the 
outstanding record of Jones’ hedge fund. Jones had outperformed the best performing mutual 
fund over the last five years, gaining a return of 670 % over the period compared to the 
mutual fund’s 358% (Fortune Magazine, 1966). 
 
The late 1960s saw the beginning of the hedge funds of Michael Steinhardt, George Soros 
and several other well-known financial heavyweights. According to Gabelli (2000), there 
were approximately 200 hedge funds in 1968. Even though Steinhardt and Soros would prove 
to be quite successful, the hedge fund industry suffered badly during the 1969-70 recession 
and during the stock market crash of 1973-74 (Ineichen, 2002). When Tremont Partners 
started researching the hedge fund industry in 1984, they were only able to find 68 funds 
(Gabelli, 2000).  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, hedge funds again started to attract much attention from the 
media and the industry boomed. Tremont Partners estimated that there were approximately 
4000 hedge funds in 1999 (Gabelli, 2000). This development continued into the 2000s, and at 
the end of 2013, hedge funds had approximately 2.600 billion USD in assets under 
management (BarclayHedge, 2014). 
 
The history of hedge funds has shown that the combination of long/short positions and 
leverage can be applied to a wide range of financial instruments. Examples of this are how 
Soros made a fortune trading in currencies (“breaking” the bank of England), how Robertson 
used derivatives, and how Simons applied advanced mathematics to predict price movements 
(sparking off the quant movement).   
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2.2 Characteristics of hedge funds 
Hedge funds exhibit a number of different characteristics. There is no single, unitary 
definition of hedge funds. Ang (2013) states that hedge funds should be defined by what they 
are not. As most hedge funds are exempt from regulations regarding responsibilities and 
limitations usually placed on mutual funds, Ang (2013) argues that hedge funds are basically 
an investment opportunity for rich people. Rich people have the possibility to hire the needed 
help, and hence they are not in a need of comprehensive investor protection. By stepping out 
of the regulation scheme to protect investors, hedge funds get a higher degree of flexibility 
with regards to how they invest, how they disclose information, and how they pay their 
managers (Ang, 2013).  
 
One of the most apposite definitions of hedge funds, is given by the co-founder of the hedge 
fund AQR Capital Management, Clifford Asness:  
 
“Hedge funds are investment pools that are relatively unconstrained in what they do. 
They are relatively unregulated (for now), charge very high fees, will not necessarily 
give you your money back when you want it, and will generally not tell you what they 
do. They are supposed to make money all the time, and when they fail at this, their 
investors redeem and go to someone else who has recently been making money. 
Every three or four years they deliver a one-in-a-hundred year flood. They are 
generally run for rich people in Geneva, Switzerland, by rich people in Greenwich, 
Connecticut.“ (Asness, 2004). 
 
As pointed out, there are several common characteristics that separate hedge funds from other 
investment funds. These characteristics will be elaborated on in the following sub-sections. 
 
2.2.1 Active management 
A common characteristic of hedge funds is that they are actively managed. Opposed to 
passively managed funds, a fundamental assumption of actively managed funds is that the 
manager has the ability to add value beyond the underlying development of the market 
(Mallaby, 2010). The implication of this is that the managers reject the efficient market 
hypothesis, at least in its stronger forms. Ilmanen (2012) states that by investing in hedge 
funds you bet on the mangers’ skill in identifying and exploiting profit opportunities.  
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2.2.2 Absolute returns 
As an actively managed fund, hedge funds have the ability, and perhaps obligation, to 
separate its performance from the underlying market development. As seen from the original 
hedge fund of Winslow, a main objective was to hedge away the market risk and aim for 
absolute returns. Absolute returns deviates from relative returns, as absolute return funds are 
expected to earn a positive return regardless of any benchmark returns (Stefanini, 2006).  
 
Stulz (2007) refers to the operations of the now famous failure Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM)2, as an example of a hedging approach supporting absolute returns. 
LTCM specialised in identifying bonds that were mispriced. The hedge fund sold bonds that 
were overvalued, while hedging its position against interest rate risk and other relevant risk 
factors. The idea was that the return of the investment would only depend on the corrections 
in the mispricing of the bonds, and not on other market factors.  
 
Today, many hedge funds still follow an absolute return approach, though this does not 
necessarily apply to all hedge funds. As stated by Stulz (2007), not all positions of hedge 
funds are hedged; hedge funds may not hedge because it is expensive, or as their positions 
simply cannot be hedged.  
 
2.2.3 Minimums are high  
As seen from Asness’ definition, hedge funds are investment vehicles for rich people. Hedge 
funds’ exempt from regulation is based on the principle that only “accredited investors”3, 
meaning rich people or investment professionals, can invest in the funds (Stulz, 2007). In 
order to avoid registration under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act in US jurisdiction, hedge 
funds cannot have more than 499 “qualified purchasers” 4. The criteria for being a “qualified 
purchaser” are even stricter than being an “accredited investor”. In other words, hedge funds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund utilising absolute-return trading strategies with 
high financial leverage. LTCM was famous for their Nobel Prize winners, Myron S. Scholes and Robert C. 
Merton. The failure of LTCM nearly collapsed the global financial system in 1998 (Lowenstein, 2000). 
3 An accredited investor has individual or net worth above $1 million or individual income above $200,000 or 
joint income of $300,000 in each of the past two years. Institutional investors must have assets exceeding $5 
million (Ang, 2013). 
4 Qualified purchasers have at least $5 million in investments. Institutional investors invest at least $100 million 
or they are pension funds and trusts with at least $25 million in assets (Ang, 2013). 
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have a limited number of investors and require high minimum investments. However, fund of 
hedge funds may have lower minimums (Ang, 2013). 
 
2.2.4 Limited access to capital 
Most investors in mutual funds have the possibility to get their money back at a daily basis. 
This is in a sharp contrast to hedge funds where the investors have to accept a longer lock-up 
period for their investments (Ang, 2013). Most hedge funds allow for withdrawal at a 
monthly or quarterly basis (Lins, Lemke, Hoenig, & Rube, 2013). Ang (2013) argues that the 
main reason for the limited access to capital is hedge funds’ significant exposure against 
short positions and other liquidity sensitive positions. Ilmanen (2012) claims that the limited 
access to capital represent an option-like cost to hedge fund investors, due to the reduced 
flexibility.  
 
 2.2.5 Leverage and Derivatives 
An exotic feature of hedge funds is their ability to employ a huge set of different investment 
strategies. Ang (2013) highlights that the use of leverage and derivatives are common 
investment tools for hedge funds. There is no official reported leverage ratio used by hedge 
funds due to their limited disclosure. However, an OECD report from 2007 estimated the 
aggregated hedge fund industry to maintain a leverage ratio above 3:1 (OECD, 2007). Ang et 
al. (2011) provides similar results, finding gross leverage ratios to be approximately 2:1. 
Naturally, there is a huge variation in the use of leverage among hedge funds; Long-Term 
Capital Management had a leverage ratio of 28:1 in 1995 (Schinasi & Todd Smith, 2000). 
However, the overall perception of hedge funds’ use of leverage is probably exaggerated. 
Compared to investment banks, hedge fund leverage ratios are fairly modest, see figure 1 
(Ang, Gorovyy, & van Inwegen, Hedge fund leverage, 2011). One extreme example is 
Lehman Brothers, which had an accounting leverage ratio of approximately 31:1 in 2007 
(Lehman Brothers, 2007). Hedge fund manager Michael Hintze of CQS, stated the following 
to Financial Times in 2012: 
 
“Hedge funds are presently leveraged one to three times; if they are mad, five times; 
if they are insane, 10 times. But 15 or 20 times was normal for banks’ trading desks.” 
(Financial Times, 2012) 
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Hedge funds use leverage when they find it attractive because they have the possibility. 
Leverage amplifies market risk and is used by hedge funds to generate returns on assets, 
which on an unlevered basis would not be sufficient to attract funds (Ang, Gorovyy, & van 
Inwegen, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1: Ang et al. (2011) compared average gross hedge fund leverage with the leverage of banks, investment 
banks, and the finance sector. The left-hand axis corresponds to average gross hedge fund leverage and the right-
hand axis corresponds to the leverage of banks, investment banks, and the finance sector. Source: (Ang, Gorovyy, & 
van Inwegen, 2011) 
 
Chen (2010) argues that derivatives represent a substantial portion of hedge fund 
investments. Depending on the purpose, derivatives may both reduce and increase the risk of 
the investments. The fact that 71 per cent of hedge funds trade derivatives, illustrates the 
significant use of derivatives by hedge funds (Chen, 2010). In comparison, the findings in 
Koski & Pontiff (1999) showed that “only” 21 per cent of mutual funs apply derivatives. In 
contrast to popular perception, hedge funds using derivatives does not necessarily imply 
higher risk. The after-fee risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds is similar for derivatives 
users and non-derivative users (Chen, 2010). 
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2.2.6 Limited disclosure 
Hedge funds have looser rules with regards to reporting, compared to other funds. As a 
consequence, hedge funds limit their disclosure of holdings and investment strategies. In the 
US, hedge funds with assets above $150 million have to register trades, brokers, leverage, 
counter-party exposures and techniques for valuing illiquid assets to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). This does not have to be reported directly to the fund 
investors. However, most funds have some kind of regular reporting to their customers, even 
though this is usually rather sparse (Ang, 2013).  
 
2.2.7 Manger fees and performance component  
“What is a hedge fund? Anything that charges 2 and 20.” (Lhabitant, 2006) 
 
The 2 and 20 refers to the typical fee structure of hedge funds, usually consisting of a 
management fee and a performance component. The management fee is commonly 2 per cent 
of the assets under management, and is supposed to cover operating expenses. The 
performance component is supposed to incentivise the managers to achieve the highest 
returns possible, and is usually around 20 per cent of annual realised performance. Most 
hedge funds combine the performance fee with a high-water mark, which is a minimum 
return that must be achieved before performance fees are eligible. The high-water mark is 
often combined with a proportional adjustment clause, which gives the fund manager the 
possibility to reduce the high-water mark by a proportional percentage if investors remove 
some of their assets (Lhabitant, 1996). In addition to this, many hedge fund managers invest 
their own money in the fund, increasing the performance incentives (Ilmanen, 2012). The 
combination of high performance fees and investments in their own funds, have made several 
of the most successful hedge funds managers billionaires. Table 1 illustrates this, by 
comparing the top-earning hedge fund mangers against the top-earning CEOs in 2013. 
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Table 1: The table illustrates the top-earning hedge fund managers and the top-earning CEOs in 2013. The earning 
figures are in US Dollars, $. Source: Time Magazine, and Institutional Investors Alpha. 
 
2.3 Different ways of accessing hedge fund returns 
The most common way of accessing hedge fund returns is to invest directly in hedge funds. 
Another possibility is to invest in fund of hedge funds. Funds of hedge funds provide access 
to hedge funds with a lower minimum capital required, compared to steep minimums 
required by ordinary hedge funds. Funds of hedge funds provide diversification, oversight 
(due diligence, fund selection skills etc.), and access to hedge funds that are no longer open 
for new investors. The downside of investing in funds of hedge funds is the double-layer of 
fees. According to Ilmanen (2012), funds of hedge funds often use a 1 per cent management 
fee and a 10 per cent performance fee on top of the 2 and 20 fee-structure of the underlying 
hedge fund. Hence, funds of hedge funds have lagged the performance of hedge funds due to 
the double layer of fees (Ilmanen, 2012). 
 
A third and rather new way of accessing hedge funds is to invest in hedge fund indices.  
Géhin & Vaissié (2004) claims that these products have further increased the liquidity and 
transparency of hedge fund investing. Investments in hedge fund indices grew rapidly to 10 
billion dollars, but are still a small fraction of the total hedge fund industry of approximately 
2.600 billion dollars5 (Géhin & Vaissié, 2004). There are several problems related to 
investing in hedge fund indices. The presence of different biases in hedge funds indices is 
substantial. Further, Géhin & Vaissié (2004) argues that most hedge funds indices fail to 
represent their investment universe, and that many of them turn out to be nothing more than 
passively managed funds of hedge funds. In addition to this, Ilmanen (2012) suggests that 
there is low participation from the top hedge funds in these indices, and that investable hedge 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 BarclayHedge (2014) estimates that the total hedge fund industry consists of approximately 2.200 billion 
dollars excluding funds of funds, and approximately 2.600 billion dollars in total. 
	  	  
11	  
fund indices have consistently underperformed broader hedge fund indices. The number of 
investable hedge fund indices remains limited today. 
 
2.4 The Norwegian hedge fund market 
In this section, we will present the Norwegian hedge fund market. First, we will present the 
legal environment in Norway. Secondly, we will give a brief explanation of the Norwegian 
hedge fund market. 
 
2.4.1 The legal environment in Norway 
The regulation of hedge funds in Norway is derived from the regulation of alternative 
investment funds, as there is no specific legal definition of hedge funds. In Norway, 
alternative investment funds are currently regulated by Verdipapirfondloven (the Norwegian 
Securities Funds Act). Hedge funds covered by the definition of an alternative investment 
fund provided by Verdipapirfondloven § 7-2., are supervised by Finanstilsynet (the Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway). There are some fund structures that do not fit the 
definition of alternative investment funds, but have similar characteristics. These funds may 
market themselves in Norway by complying with Verdipapirfondloven § 9-4 (The Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2014). 
 
Currently, the legal environment in Norway only allows hedge funds to market themselves 
and engage with professional customers. Therefore, a Norwegian private investor cannot 
invest in hedge funds. This is independent of the customer’s wishes; a non-professional 
investor is not allowed to engage privately in hedge funds in Norway (The Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2012). 
 
In order to offer alternative investment funds like hedge funds to professional investors in 
Norway, the alternative investment fund must have permission from Finanstilsynet. To 
receive this permission there are two possibilities: either the fund must be Norwegian and 
established by an asset management company, or registered as a foreign alternative 
investment fund. In both cases, it has to be clearly stated that the fund is an alternative 
investment fund through its statutes. Verdipapirfondloven defines several exceptions and 
special provisions for alternative investment funds. Among these provisions are rules stating 
that the statutes of the alternative investment fund shall specify the investment universe, 
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strategy, and risk management mechanisms. With regards to foreign alternative investment 
funds operating in Norway, a central provision demands that Norwegian investors should be 
provided the same protection as if they were investing in a Norwegian fund. 
Verdipapirfondloven further requires a satisfactory cooperation with the financial supervisory 
authority of the country of origin of the hedge fund. Finanstilsynet currently cooperate on 
supervisory matters with the US and the EEA countries (The Financial Supervisory Authority 
of Norway, 2012). 
 
On the 22nd of July 2013, the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD) 
went into force in the EU. The AIFMD is aimed at addressing the perceived lack of coherent 
regulation of alternative investments funds, including hedge funds (ESMA, 2013). The 
European Commission stated that the overall ambition of the AIFMD is to: 
“Provide a clear and consistent framework for the regulation and supervision of the 
AIFMs in the EU, (…) as well as establishing a mechanism for creating a single 
European market for AIFs” (European Comission, 2011). 
 
The AIFMD regulates alternative investment fund managers operating in the EU, regardless 
of whether they are based in the EU or elsewhere (Zepeda, 2014). Requirements under the 
AIFMD exceed the mere registration and disclosure of operating information under the 
Dodd-Frank Act applicable in the US. The AIFMD addresses obligations relating to the 
delegation of AIFM functions, obligations with regards to investor protection, conflicts of 
interest, remuneration policies, and risk management (Zepeda, 2014). 
 
In May 2012, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway initiated a process in order to 
propose the necessary adjustments and changes of the Norwegian regulation to accommodate 
the adaption of the AIFMD (Schjodt Law Firm, 2013). The deadline for comments expired 
on the 20th of June 2013, and the legislative proposal (Prop. 77 L 2013-2014) was made 
public on the 11th of April 2014. At the 13th of May 2014, the Finance Committee of the 
Norwegian Parliament delivered their recommendation, suggesting that the legislative 
proposal should be made law (The Norwegian Parliament, 2014). Finanstilsynet expects 
implementation of the AIFMD to the Norwegian legal system by 2014, provided that the 
necessary adoption of the new legislation is approved by the Norwegian Parliament (The 
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2013). The legislative proposal by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Finance suggests that the implementation of the AIFMD in Norway 
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will entail the possibility of marketing and providing hedge funds for all Norwegian 
investors. This includes both professional and non-professional private investors. In order to 
ensure appropriate investor protection, the fund managers would face extensive regulation in 
terms of licensing requirements and organisational requirements. The legislative proposal 
advises that the Norwegian Ministry of Finance is empowered to determine further 
requirements through statutory regulation (The Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2014). These 
requirements have not yet been drafted.  
 
As of the 21th of May 2014, the legislative proposal has not yet been approved by the 
Norwegian Parliament. Until the AIFMD has been fully implemented, hedge funds operating 
in Norway are still subject to the regulations of Verdipapirfondloven elaborated above.  
 
To sum up, hedge funds operating in Norway are currently only allowed to engage with 
professional customers. However, a recent legislative proposal (Prop. 77 L 2013-2014) will 
likely be adopted in the first half of 2014, suggesting that hedge funds should be accessible 
for all Norwegian investors. 
 
2.4.2 Norwegian hedge funds 
Alternative investment funds registered in Norway can be found in the license registry of 
Finanstilsynet. Figure 2 illustrates the recent development of the registered alternative 
investment funds in Norway. In addition, some foreign-registered funds operate in Norway 
under the application of the appropriate provisions of Verdipapirloven.  
 
A complete overview of the hedge funds operating in Norway does not exist. Therefore, we 
have relied on the database of Hedgenordic in order to provide a representation of the 
Norwegian hedge fund market. Be aware that the dataset of Hedgenordic includes hedge 
funds that are not to be found in the license registry of Finanstilsynet. This may be due to the 
fact that some of the hedge funds used in our historical dataset are foreign-registered or that 
they have ceased to exist. 
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Figure 2: The figure to the left illustrates the recent development of registered alternative investment funds in 
Norway. The figure to the right illustrates the recent development in assets under management (AUM) of registered 
Norwegian alternative investment funds. Source: (The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, 2012). 
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3.0 STATISTICAL PROPERTIES OF HEDGE FUND RETURNS 
This chapter consists of the theory regarding the statistical properties related to hedge fund 
index returns. In the first section, we present the definitions of holding period return. In the 
second section, we introduce the return distribution and the centralised moments. In the third 
and last section, we present two different correlation coefficients.  
 
3.1 Holding period return 
Pinto et al. (2010) defines holding period return as the return earned from investing in an 
asset over a specified time period. The returns can be separated into investment income 
(capital gains) and price appreciation components, as shown by the following formula: 𝑟 =   𝐷!𝑃! +   𝑃!   −   𝑃!𝑃!                                                                                                                   (3.1) 
where, 
 𝐷! = the dividend paid out at time h, 
 𝑃!   = the price at time h, and 
 𝑃!   = the price at time 0. 
 
If the asset is purchased at t = 0 and sold at t = h, the return consists of received capital gains 
(𝐷!) and price increase (𝑃! −   𝑃!) at t = h. Equation 3.1 assumes for simplicity that any 
capital gains are received at the end of the holding period.  
 
For a holding period in the past, the selling price and the dividend from equitation 3.1 are 
known. The return is then called realised holding period return, or more simply realised 
return (Pinto J., Henry, Robinson, & Stowe, 2010). For a future holding period, the returns 
are random variables where capital gains, buying prices, and selling prices can have a range 
of different values. Investors can form expectations of what these values will be, known as 
the expected holding period return or expected return of an asset (Pinto J., Henry, Robinson, 
& Stowe, 2010).  
 
A common estimate of the expected holding period return is the realised holding period 
return (Elton, 1999). Elton (1999) highlights that the use of the average realised returns as an 
indicator for expected returns is based on a belief that information surprises tends to cancel 
out over a period of study, and therefore provides an unbiased estimate of expected returns. 
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Following this logic, we use the realised holding period returns as a proxy for the expected 
holding period returns. 
 
3.2 Return distribution and centralised moments 
According to Hens & Bachmann (2008), investments in different assets are usually described 
by a relative frequency histogram of their returns. This framework enables the possibility of 
studying the shape of the return distribution and link the return distribution to a specific 
statistical distribution framework. The most commonly used return distribution framework in 
finance is tightly linked to modern portfolio theory. In his paper “Portfolio Selection” from 
1952, Harry Markowitz suggests that the best method for comparing risky assets is to rate the 
assets based on their expected return and variance. Based on the ideas of Markowitz (1952), 
it is convenient to use the statistical distribution that is defined by its expected return and 
variance – the normal distribution.  
 
3.2.1 Normal distribution 
Normal distribution, commonly also referred to as Gaussian distribution, is defined by a bell-
shaped curve illustrating the mean (expected return) and the standard deviation of the 
variables. The normal distribution curve is illustrated in figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: The figure illustrates the normal distribution curve, where Mean = Median = Mode. Source: (Doane & 
Seward, 2011). 
 
When looking at distributions, moments are defined as numerical characteristics of the 
probability distribution (Encyclopedia of Mathematics, 2012). We will elaborate on four 
central moments of the normal distribution. 
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3.2.2 First central moment – the mean 
According to Johnson & Kotz (1970), the first moment of a distribution is the mean, or the 
expected return of the distribution. This is the value of the variable that is most likely to 
occur, illustrated by being the highest point of the bell shaped normal distribution curve. The 
mean is given by: 
 
𝜇 = 𝐸   𝑟 =    1𝑁    𝑟! =   𝑟!!!!                                                                                                     (3.2) 
where 
 𝐸 = the expectation operator, 
 𝑁 = the number of observations, and 
 𝑟! = the return at time n. 
 
3.2.3 Second central moment – the variance  
The second moment of a distribution is the variance (Johnson & Kotz, 1970). Variance is the 
average squared deviation from the mean. In an investment setting, the variance is the 
measurement of risk, as specified by Markowitz (1952). Variance is given by: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =   𝜎! = 𝐸 𝑟 − 𝐸 𝑟 ! =    1𝑁    𝑟! −   𝑟 !!!!!                                                   (3.3) 
where 
 𝐸 = the expectation operator, 
 𝑁 = the number of observations, 
 𝑟! = the return at time n, and 
 𝑟     = the mean. 
 
As the units of variance differ from the units of return, it is useful to transform the variance 
into the standard deviation. The standard deviation is equal to the square root of the variance: 
 
  𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝜎 = 𝜎! =    1𝑁    𝑟! −   𝑟 !!!!!                                                   (3.4) 
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3.2.4 Third central moment – the skewness 
The third normalised moment of the distribution is the skewness. The skewness is the cubed 
deviation from the mean, measuring the symmetry of the distribution.  If the skewness is 
positive, the distribution will have a longer tail to the right. This implies small losses and 
larger gains. If the skewness is negative, with a longer tail to the left, the distribution will 
have larger losses and small gains. A strict normal distribution will have a skewness of zero 
(Doane & Seward, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 4: The figure illustrates the effect of skewness on the normal distribution curve. Source: (Doane & Seward, 
2011). 
 
The skewness is given by:  
 
𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑆) =    𝜇!𝜎! =   𝐸 𝑟 − 𝐸 𝑟 !𝜎! =    1𝑁      (𝑟! −   𝑟)!𝜎!!!!! =   𝜇!                            (3.5) 
where 
 𝐸   = the expectation operator, 
 𝑁   = the number of observations, 
 𝑟!   = the return at time n, 
 𝑟       = the mean, and 
 𝜎! = the standard deviation, with the power of 3. 
 
3.2.5 Fourth central moment – the kurtosis 
The fourth moment of the distribution is the kurtosis, which measures the peakedness and 
tails of the distribution. The kurtosis indicates the probability of extreme values (DeCarlo, 
1997).  
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The kurtosis is given by: 
 
𝐾𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠 =    𝜇!𝜎! =   𝐸 𝑟 − 𝐸 𝑟 !𝜎! =    1𝑁      (𝑟! −   𝑟)!𝜎!!!!! =   𝜇!                                    (3.6) 
where 
 𝐸 = the expectation operator, 
 𝑁 = the number of observations, 
 𝑟! = the return at time n, 
 𝑟     = the mean, and 
 𝜎! = the standard deviation, with the power of 4. 
 
A normal distribution obtains a kurtosis of 3. The excess kurtosis is therefore calculated to 
make this value zero, and given by: 
 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠  𝑘𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑠  (𝐾) =   𝜇! − 3 
 
For a normal distribution with excess kurtosis of zero, the curve will have a bell shape, 
known as Mesokurtic distribution. Positive excess kurtosis, Leptokurtic distribution, will 
have more values close to the mean, as well as higher probability of extreme values 
compared to a normal distribution. The curve will then have higher peakedness and fat tails. 
Negative excess kurtosis, Platykurtic distribution, will have a lower possibility of extreme 
values and fewer values located close to the mean. The curve will have a softer peak and 
smaller “shoulders” on the edge, in other words light tails and flatness (DeCarlo, 1997). The 
effect of excess kurtosis can be seen in figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: The dotted lines indicate the normal distribution, while the solid lines indicate the distributions with 
positive excess kurtosis (left panel) and negative excess kurtosis (right panel).  𝜷𝟐 − 𝟑 = 𝐞𝐱𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬  𝐤𝐮𝐫𝐭𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐬, where 𝜷𝟐 =   𝝁𝟒. Source: (DeCarlo, 1997). 
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3.2.6 Normality tests 
According to Rachev et al. (2010), there are several ways of testing whether a given data set 
is normally distributed. A normality test that takes into consideration the higher moments of 
skewness and kurtosis is the Jarque-Bera test (Rachev, Hoechstoetter, Focardi, & Fabozzi, 
2010). The Jarque-Bera test, defines a null hypothesis stating that the data is normally 
distributed, and an alternative hypothesis stating that the distribution is arbitrary. To test the 
null hypothesis, the Jarque-Bera evaluates whether the data have skewness and kurtosis 
matching a normal distribution. Kat & Brooks (2001), among others, use this test for testing 
the normality of hedge fund returns. 
 
The Jarque-Bera, JB, test statistic is given by: 
 𝐽𝐵 =   𝑁6    𝑆! +   𝐾!4                                                                                                                  (3.7) 
where 𝑁 = the number of observations or degrees of freedom in general, 𝑆   = the sample skewness, 𝜇!, and 𝐾 = the sample excess kurtosis,  𝜇! − 3. 
 
The Jarque-Bera test statistic is based on a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of 
freedom. From this chi-squared distribution, a critical value is defined. The null hypothesis is 
rejected if the value of the test statistics exceeds the critical value (Jarque & Bera, 1980). 
3.3 Correlation 
In statistics, correlation refers to relationships involving dependence. Dependence is a 
statistical relationship between two random variables or sets of data. The correlation will tell 
you the degree to which the variables tend to move together. The correlation will only infer 
on co-movement and is not related to causality (Ji, 2006). The reason for investors’ interest in 
correlation can be found in the modern portfolio theory of Markowitz (1952). Markowitz 
stated that diversification could be reached from any combination of assets that is not 
perfectly positively correlated. There are several different methods for estimating the 
correlation between data series. Two of the most commonly used are Pearson’s product-
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moment correlation coefficient and Spearman’s rank correlation (Lomax & Hahs-Vaughn, 
2012). 
 
3.3.1 Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient assumes that the data samples are from a 
normally distributed population. Pearson’s correlation measures the linear correlation 
between two variables, and estimates a value of the correlation ranging from -1 to +1. There 
is no correlation if the value is zero, there is perfect negative correlation if the value is -1, and 
there is perfect positive correlation if the value is +1 (Lomax & Hahs-Vaughn, 2012). 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient for a population, 𝜌!,!, is given by: 
 𝜌!,! =    𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑟! , 𝑟!)𝜎!𝜎! =   𝐸 𝑟! − 𝜇! 𝑟! − 𝜇!𝜎!𝜎!                                                                     (3.8) 
where 
 𝑐𝑜𝑣 = the covariance, 
 𝜎!       = the standard deviation of i, 
 𝐸         = the expectation operator, 
 𝜇!       = the mean of i, and 
 𝑟!         =  the sample data (e.g. return) of i. 
 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient could also be applied to a sample of the population, where 
the formula is given by: 𝑟 =    𝑋! −   𝑋   (𝑌! − 𝑌)!!!!𝑋! − 𝑋 !!!!!    ∙ 𝑌! − 𝑌 !!!!!                                                                               (3.9) 
where 
 𝑋! ,𝑌! = a sample pair of data, 
 𝑋             =  the mean of the sample scores of X, and 
 𝑌             =  the mean of the sample scores of Y. 
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3.3.2 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is suitable for data series that are not normally 
distributed, or if there are huge outliers in the dataset. Spearman’s correlation is a non-
parametric measure of correlation. This implies that it can be used when the variables are not 
related by a linear function, and without knowing the joint probability distribution of the 
variables. The method of Spearman converts the data to rankings before the correlation is 
calculated, using the Pearson method on the rankings. The interpretation of Spearman’s 
correlation is similar to Pearson’s correlation: a positive correlation coefficient indicates co-
movement between variables, a negative correlation coefficient indicates that one variable 
decreases as the other increases, and a zero correlation coefficient indicates no tendency 
(Lomax & Hahs-Vaughn, 2012). 
 
The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, 𝜌, is given by the formula:  
 
𝜌 = 1− 6   𝑑 !!𝑁 𝑁! − 1!!!!                                                                                                 (3.10) 
where 
 𝑁         = the number of rankings, and 
 𝑑 !! = the nth square difference of the ranking. 
 
3.3.3 Statistical significance of correlation coefficient: two-sided t-test 
According to Furr (2005), the statistical significance of correlation coefficients can be 
calculated in order to state, with a given amount of certainty, whether there is correlation 
present. The statistical significance of correlation coefficients can be tested using a two-sided 
t-test, given the following assumptions (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989): 
1. The samples are drawn from populations that follow a bivariate normal distribution. 
2. The samples are random samples from the population. 
3. The population correlation coefficient is zero. 
 
The test statistic, T, is given by: 𝑇 =   𝑟 𝑁 − 21− 𝑟!                                                                                                                       (3.11) 
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where 𝑁         = sample size, and 𝑟           = sample correlation. 
 
The test statistic follows a t-distribution with N-2 degrees of freedom, and is compared to a 
critical value derived from the chosen confidence interval (Furr, 2005). We have chosen a 5% 
confidence level for our calculations, implying that there is a less than 5% chance of an 
incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis (Furr, 2005). The most common significance test of 
a correlation defines a null hypothesis stating that the population correlation is zero 
(H!:  ρ = 0) (Furr, 2005). If the calculated test statistic is above the critical value, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. In our empirical research, we will use the following hypothesis: 
 𝐻!:  𝜌 = 0 
 𝐻!:  𝜌   ≠ 0 
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4.0 MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY 
The first section of this chapter presents the mean-variance framework. The second and last 
section of this chapter, gives a brief description of asset pricing models.  
 
4.1 The Mean-Variance framework 
Modern portfolio theory was introduced in Markowitz (1952), building on mean-variance 
selection theory. Markowitz’ research is considered among the most important contributions 
to financial theory, and he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 
1990. Though it has inspired and led to various extensions and applications, the mean-
variance framework is still widely used in performance evaluation of investments 
(Frängsmyr, 1991). In the following sub-sections, we elaborate on the Markowitz efficient 
frontier, the capital allocation line, and criticism of the mean-variance framework.  
 
4.1.1 Markowitz Efficient Frontier 
The introduction of Markowitz’ modern portfolio theory was revolutionary in the world of 
finance. At the time, investors were emphasising the selection of single assets with the 
highest returns and lowest risk (Galloppo, 2010). Investors would compose a portfolio 
without considering the assets’ effect on the total portfolio. Markowitz proposed a new way 
of creating a portfolio, by suggesting that investors should diversify their investments to 
minimise expected risk and maximise expected returns. According to Markowitz (1952), the 
overall portfolio risk can be reduced if the investor diversifies the portfolio by investing in 
different assets. 
 
Markowitz’ modern portfolio theory assumes investors to be risk-averse. When faced with 
two investments with similar expected return, but with different risks, a risk-averse investor 
will prefer the one with the lower risk (Danthine & Donaldson, 2005).  
 
Expected return and standard deviation are used as proxies for reward and risk, and the 
available investment opportunities will constitute the minimum-variance frontier of risky 
assets. The minimum-variance frontier provides the highest possible return for a given risk, 
and vice-versa the lowest possible risk for a given return. The trade-off between risk and 
return will depend on the investor’s degree of risk aversion. The optimal trade-off between 
risk and expected return is captured by the efficient frontier, shown in figure 6. The efficient 
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frontier is located above and to the right of the global minimum variance portfolio, on the 
minimum-variance frontier. Assets located below the efficient frontier are considered 
inefficient, as other assets can generate higher expected return at the same risk (Bodie, Kane, 
& Marcus, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 6: The figure illustrates the minimum-variance frontier, the global minimum variance portfolio, and the 
efficient frontier. The X-axis indicates the standard deviation (σ), while the Y-axis indicates the expected return 
(E(r)). Source: (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005). 
 
4.1.2 The Capital Allocation Line 
By introducing a risk-free asset, it is possible to create a risk-return profile that is superior to 
those on the efficient frontier. The risk-free asset is uncorrelated with the other asset classes, 
and allows the investors to borrow and loan at a risk-free rate. Combining the risk-free asset 
with a given combination of risky assets, located on the efficient frontier, will create the 
capital allocation line (CAL). The CAL shows the investor’s available portfolio opportunities 
from the combination of the risky portfolio and the risk-free asset. The CAL is a straight line 
and is defined as: 𝐸 𝑟! = 𝑟! + 𝜎! 𝐸 𝑟 − 𝑟!𝜎                                                                                                       (4.1) 
where 
 𝐸 𝑟! = the expected return of a combination of a given risky portfolio and the    
risk-free asset, 𝐸 𝑟       = the expected return of a given risky portfolio,  𝑟!                 = the risk-free rate, 𝜎                   = the standard deviation of a given portfolio, and 
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𝜎!               =  the standard deviation of the combination of the optimal risky portfolio and 
the risk-free asset. 
 
The slope of the CAL represents the risk/reward ratio, also known as the Sharpe ratio 
(Sharpe, 1964): 𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 =   𝐸 𝑟 − 𝑟!𝜎                                                                                                                    4.2  
 
The portfolio on the efficient frontier with the highest risk/reward ratio is known as the 
market portfolio (indicated with an M in figure 7). By combining the market portfolio with a 
risk-free asset, the capital market line (CML) is created. The CML is a tangent to the efficient 
frontier, and would be the optimal choice for every investor. Each investor can move up or 
down, depending on how much risk they want, by either investing a part of the portfolio in 
the risk-free asset (decreasing the total risk) or by gearing6 the portfolio (increasing the total 
risk) (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 7: The figure illustrates the capital market line (CML), and the market portfolio (M). The X-axis indicates the 
standard deviation (σ), while the Y-axis indicates the expected return (E(r)). Source: (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 2005). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Gearing indicates that the investor is borrowing money at risk-free rate to invest in risky investment, like the 
market portfolio. 
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4.1.3 Criticism of the Mean-Variance framework  
One simplifying assumption of the mean-variance framework is that risk can be fully 
described by the variance. To be valid, portfolio theory based on the mean-variance 
framework has to satisfy one of the following assumptions (Tobin, 1958): 
1. Distribution of asset returns belongs to the two-parameter family7, e.g. normally 
distributed returns. 
2. The investor holds a quadratic utility function, i.e. the investor’s goal is to maximise 
return and minimise variance of the return distribution.  
 
In order to solve the maximisation problem, a quadratic utility function implies that the 
investor only cares about the first two moments of the distribution: the mean and the 
variance. Bodie et al. (2005) describes the utility that an investor derives from a portfolio 
with an expected return and standard deviation as the following quadratic utility function:  
 𝑈 = 𝐸 𝑟 − 𝐴𝜎!                                                                                                                        (4.3) 
where 𝑈               = the investors utility, 
 𝐸 𝑟 =  the expected return (mean), 𝐴               = the investor’s degree of risk aversion (where A ≥ 0), and 𝜎!           =  the variance. 
 
Indicated by this quadratic utility function, the utility function is a curve with a decreasing 
slope, where the investor only considers the expected return (mean) and variance. A quadratic 
utility function, like the one described above, will only have a positive marginal utility under 
the bounded range. According to Wippern (1971), this places an unrealistic behaviour on the 
investors. 
 
From the utility function in equation 4.3, one can derive that the investors have an increasing 
risk aversion. An increasing risk-aversion implies reduced risk taking as wealth increases. 
Empirical evidence and theoretical consideration would indicate differently. Pratt (1964) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Distributions belonging to the two-parameter family can be described by two parameters. An example is the 
normal distribution that can be described by its mean and standard deviation. 
	  	  
28	  
Arrow (1965) indicate that investors have a decreasing absolute risk-aversion8. In the real 
world, the utility functions will not be as simple as described above, as the utility functions 
can be highly complex and have an irregular shape (Hens & Bachmann, 2008). As the second 
assumption of Tobin (1958) is not satisfied, one has to assume that the returns are normally 
distributed, fully described by its mean and variance, for the Markowitz portfolio theory to be 
valid.  
 
4.2 Asset Pricing Models  
Asset pricing models value assets relative to the market or other sources of risk, also known 
as “factors”. One usually separates between single and multifactor models. The most 
recognised single-factor model is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966). The CAPM explains the price of an asset by one single 
factor, the sensitivity of a given asset’s returns to market movements (known as the market 
beta). A multifactor model, like the Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Ross (1976), uses several 
factors in the calculation of the expected return. The sensitivity to changes in each factor is 
represented by a factor-specific beta coefficient. Each investor needs to identify the factors 
that are affecting an asset, as well as the factors’ risk premium and the sensitivity of these 
factors. Later extensions have been made to adopt the factor-specific beta coefficients outside 
the equity universe. In this context, the term alternative betas is used to describe the factor-
specific beta coefficients that measures the sensitivity of an asset to the different risk 
premiums that are available in the global financial markets (Jaeger, 2008). 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Absolute risk-aversion is independent of the wealth of the investor, i.e. the investor will not change his risk 
preferences when his wealth changes (Hens & Bachmann, 2008). 
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5.0 RISK-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
For a risk-averse investor, the level of returns must be compared to the risk undertaken, and 
the investor needs to be compensated for the risk exposure. The risk-adjusted performance 
measures can be divided into relative- and absolute performance measures. Relative 
performance measures evaluate an asset’s risk-adjusted returns in reference to a benchmark 
(Le Sourd, 2007). As many of the hedge fund strategies are very different, one could argue 
that each strategy would need its own benchmark. Ilmanen (2012) argues that for hedge 
funds, as “absolute return funds”, the appropriate benchmark would be cash, while others 
would argue for a benchmark consisting of both stocks and bonds. Due to the difficulties of 
finding an appropriate benchmark for hedge funds, we have scoped this assignment to look at 
performance measures that do not use a benchmark, the absolute performance measures (Le 
Sourd, 2007).  
 
In this chapter, we present two different performance measures. In the first section, we 
introduce the traditional Sharpe ratio, while the second and last section elaborates on the 
Modified Sharpe ratio. 
 
5.1 The Sharpe ratio 
In addition to being one of the originators of the CAPM, William F. Sharpe developed one of 
the most commonly used performance measures, the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio is based 
upon the assumptions of mean-variance theory, assuming that returns are normally 
distributed and/or that the investor has a quadratic utility function (Sharpe, 1966).  
 
The Sharpe ratio measures the risk premium compared to the total risk of the portfolio. The 
ratio describes how much excess return you are receiving for the extra volatility that you 
endure for holding a risker asset. The Sharpe ratio for investment i,  𝑆𝑅!, is defined as 
(Sharpe, 1966): 𝑆𝑅! =   𝐸 𝑟! − 𝑟!𝜎!                                                                                                                       (5.1) 
where 
 𝐸 𝑟!     = the expected return of the investment, 
 𝑟!                 = the return on the risk-free asset, and 𝜎!                 = the standard deviation of the investment returns. 
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As the Sharpe ratio is based on the total risk of the investment, which is made up by the 
systematic and unsystematic risk9, the Sharpe ratio is most appropriate for evaluating 
relatively diversified portfolios. Assuming the investment to be standalone, it will penalise 
non-diversified portfolios by taking into account the unsystematic risk. A standalone 
investment is defined as a single investment, not taking into account how the investment 
would affect the investor’s portfolio. The higher Sharpe ratio, the better is the investment 
(Christy & Clendenin, 1978). 
 
5.1.1 Criticism of the Sharpe ratio 
The Sharpe ratio is based on mean-variance theory, assuming that all asset returns are 
normally distributed and/or that investors have mean-variance preferences, ignoring 
skewness and excess kurtosis. When using traditional performance measures on distributions 
that are skewed or have excess kurtosis, the inherent risk is not fully captured. As a 
consequence, this may lead to wrong conclusions on the risk-adjusted performance. Under 
relative weak assumptions, Scott & Horvath (1980) shows that investors like positive 
skewness and dislike positive excess kurtosis. A further drawback is the fact that traditional 
performance measures do not distinguish between upside and downside risk, as investors are 
often more unpleased with a loss than they are pleased with a gain of equal size. As a 
consequence, one can argue that the downside deviation should be heavier weighted when 
measuring the performance of an asset (Hens & Bachmann, 2008). 
 
5.2 The Modified Sharpe ratio  
Several innovative performance measures have been developed as a consequence of the 
limitations of the traditional performance measures. In this section, we look further into the 
Modified Sharpe ratio, presented in Gregoriou & Gueyie (2003). 
 
In 2002, Favre & Galeano introduced the Modified Value-at-Risk (MVaR). The MVaR is 
defined as: 𝑀𝑉𝑎𝑅 = 𝐸 𝑟! − 𝓏! + 16 𝓏!! − 1 𝑆 + 124 𝓏!! − 3𝓏! 𝐾 − 136 2𝓏!! − 5𝓏! 𝑆! ∙ 𝜎!         (5.2) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Systematic risk is the variance due to the common market factor (known as the market beta in the CAPM 
framework), while the unsystematic risk is the variance due to firm specific unanticipated events. 
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where 
 𝐸 𝑟! = a given investment/asset/portfolio’s expected return, the mean, 
 𝓏!           = critical value for probability (1 – α), -1.96 for 95% probability, 
 𝑆               = the sample skewness, 
 𝐾             =  the sample excess kurtosis, and 
 𝜎!             =  a given investment/asset/portfolio’s standard deviation. 
 
Relying on the work of Favre & Galeano (2002), Gregoriou & Gueyie (2003) introduced an 
extension of the traditional Sharpe ratio, the Modified Sharpe ratio. The authors proposed to 
use MVaR instead of the standard deviation as the risk measure. The replacement of the 
standard deviation is justified by the fact that the MVaR takes skewness and kurtosis into 
account, in addition to mean and standard deviation. Gregoriou & Gueyie (2003) found that 
the traditional Sharpe ratio overestimates the performance in comparison to the Modified 
Sharpe ratio for non-normal results. The exception is when the normal Sharpe ratio is 
negative. 
   
The Modified Sharpe ratio for investment i, 𝑆𝑅!!"#$%$&#, is defined as (Gregoriou & Gueyie, 
2003): 𝑆𝑅!!"#$%$&# = 𝐸 𝑟! − 𝑟!𝑀𝑉𝑎𝑅!                                                                                                           (5.3) 
where 
 𝐸 𝑟!         = a given investment/asset/portfolio’s expected return, the mean, 
 𝑟!                     = the risk free return, and 
 𝑀𝑉𝑎𝑅! = the Modified Value-at-Risk. 
  
5.2.1 Criticism of the Modified Sharpe ratio 
The Modified Sharpe ratio provides a useful extension to the Sharpe ratio, as it takes into 
consideration the higher moments of the return distribution. However, the use of the 
Modified Sharpe ratio as a performance measure has some flaws. The critique of the 
traditional Sharpe ratio with regards to differentiating between downside and upside risk is 
not fully corrected under the Modified Sharpe ratio. Research by Lo (2002), suggests that 
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autocorrelation10 in hedge fund returns data can overstate the Sharpe ratio by 65 per cent. 
Similar to the Sharpe ratio, the Modified Sharpe ratio does not adjust for autocorrelation, and 
thus may overstate fund performance. With regards to the biases inherent in returns data (see 
chapter 7.0), the Modified Sharpe ratio is not able to correct for these biases, and the return 
performance may therefore be inflated (Ilmanen, 2012).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For theory on autocorrelation, see appendix H. 
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6.0 HEDGE FUND STRATEGIES 
Over the years, hedge funds have been known to use a variety of different strategies. On the 
most basic level, hedge funds can be classified into two different categories: directional and 
non-directional. The non-directional hedge funds are considered to be “market neutral”, i.e. 
not depending on the direction of the market. Directional hedge funds, also known as “market 
timing funds”, use strategies based on the anticipation of future market movements. 
Directional strategies are generally designed to exploit short-term market inefficiencies (Fung 
& Hsieh, 1999). 
 
The wide variety of strategies that persist among different hedge funds, provide very different 
risk and return profiles. Hedge fund strategies are not homogenous; each fund manager 
argues that their strategy is unique, making it difficult to describe them. However, it is 
possible to group the strategies into certain fundamental categories. This makes it possible to 
evaluate how a particular strategy might perform under certain macroeconomic conditions.  
 
In this chapter, we will present some of the most common hedge funds strategies. Credit 
Suisse, Hedgenordic and several other data providers assign hedge funds to these different 
strategies. In the following sections, we will elaborate on nine hedge fund strategies: 
Long/Short Equity, Dedicated Short Bias, Merger Arbitrage, Fixed-Income Arbitrage, 
Convertible Arbitrage, Global Macro, Managed Futures & Commodity Trading Advisors, 
Multi-Strategy, and Fund of Hedge Funds. 
 
6.1 Long/Short Equity 
Long/Short equity, also called equity hedge, are strategies where hedge fund managers 
purchase stocks they believe to be undervalued, and/or sell short stock they deem to be 
overvalued. A short position is when a manger borrows shares to sell to a third part. The 
hedge funds will profit when the long positions appreciate and if the short positions 
depreciate. By combining long and short position of equities, the managers try to reduce the 
market risk. In most cases, hedge funds with a long/short equity strategy will have a positive 
exposure to the equity markets. For example, having 70% of the funds invested long in stocks 
and 30% invested in the shorting of stocks, indicating no use of leverage. In the given 
example, the net exposure to the equity markets is 40%. However, if the manager increases 
the long position in the fund to 80%, while still maintaining a 30% short position, the fund 
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would have a gross exposure of 110%, indicating a leverage of 10%. It is normal that 
managers increase their long exposure in bull markets, and decrease it or go net short in bear 
markets11 (Ang, 2013). 
 
6.2 Dedicated Short Bias 
Dedicated short bias strategies involve holding a net short exposure to the market. Dedicated 
short bias strategies earn profits when the market declines, holding investments that are 
overall biased to the short side. As the manager expects the stock price to decline, he or she 
will buy the shares back at a lower price and return them to the lender with a profit. However, 
if the price increases, the original selling price will be lower than the repurchase price, and 
the manger will suffer a loss. Dedicated short bias strategies can be extremely risky when 
applied on a stand-alone basis, as the theoretical downside potential is unlimited (Stefanini, 
2006).  
 
As most traditional managers have a primary focus on long term buy and hold opportunities, 
a dedicated short selling strategy will be unexploited. An unexploited strategy indicates an 
advantage for the mangers, but also a high degree of uncertainty and additional risks 
involved. Short sellers will suffer from natural long-term bull markets, as stocks tend to 
appreciate over time (Stefanini, 2006).  
 
6.3 Merger Arbitrage 
Merger arbitrage strategies derive its returns from takeover activity. The strategies involve 
investing in securities of a company that is targeted for a takeover or merger, after the 
transaction is announced. When a takeover is publicly announced, the value of the acquiring 
company’s shares is potentially overvalued. As the deal is subjected to certain conditions, 
like regulatory approval and a favourable vote by target company shareholders, the target 
company shares trade for less than the merger consider the per-share value to be. The hedge 
fund may purchase shares in the targeted company, and sell short the acquiring company’s 
shares. A typical position involves holding a long position that can close out the short 
position if the deal is completed. The potential profit or loss depends on the difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A ”bull” market is charactherised by optimism, where market securities are expected to rise. A ”bear” market 
is charactherised by pessimism, where market securities are expected to fall (Stefanini, 2006). 
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between the price spread of the shares purchased and the realised value when the deal is 
completed (Ang, 2013).  
 
6.4 Fixed-Income Arbitrage 
With fixed-income arbitrage strategies, hedge funds seek out returns from risk-free 
government bonds, eliminating credit risk. The funds combine long and short positions with 
derivative instruments, making leveraged bets on whether the shape of the yield curve will 
change over a time period. These kinds of bets can be very effective as interest rates tend to 
move up and down together. As the strategies remove much of the day-to-day portfolio risks, 
fixed-income arbitrage funds usually use high leverage to boost what would otherwise be 
fairly modest returns (Stefanini, 2006). 
 
6.5 Convertible Arbitrage 
A convertible security is a type of financial instrument that can be converted into another 
type of financial instrument. The most common convertible securities are convertible bonds 
and convertible preferred stock, which can be changed into equity or common stock.  
 
Convertible arbitrage is a type of long/short equity strategy. However, instead of purchasing 
and shorting stocks, a convertible arbitrage strategy involves taking a long position in 
convertible securities and a short position of the same company’s common stock. The idea 
behind the convertible arbitrage strategies are that a company’s convertible bonds might be 
priced inefficiently relative to the company’s stock, as pricing a convertible security often is 
very difficult. According to Lhabitant (2006), correctly pricing convertible securities are 
difficult as there are simultaneous presences of interest risk, credit risk, and equity risk, as 
well as the interaction between these. As convertible securities often are valued differently 
than their fair value, hedge funds will attempt to profit from the arbitrage opportunity that 
occurs. Issuers of convertible securities are typically young and fast growing companies, with 
a low debt rating (Stefanini, 2006). 
 
6.6 Global Macro 
Generally, global macro strategies are known to create some of the highest hedge fund 
returns, but the strategies also involve taking a high degree of risk (Mallaby, 2010). Many of 
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the most profiled hedge funds, such as the Quantum Fund of George Soros and the Long 
Term Capital Management fund, pursued a global macro strategy.  
 
Global macro funds tend to be very different from each other and they invest in all the core 
asset classes (stocks, bonds, and cash), as well as currencies, commodities, and other forms of 
derivatives. According to Lhabitant (2006), most global macro funds have two typical 
characteristics: a global perspective and a main focus on the macroeconomic environment. 
With a global perspective, they can easier diversify their investments and increase the size of 
the markets they invest in. As a consequence, they can be larger than most other hedge funds 
before capacity issues challenge them. Focusing on the macroeconomic environment, they 
will analyse and exploit structural macroeconomic imbalances and try to discover 
macroeconomic trends (Stefanini, 2006).  
 
6.7 Managed Futures & Commodity Trading Advisors 
Lhabitant (2006) states that: 
”Managed futures, Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) and trading funds are now 
used interchangeably to describe the group of professional money managers that use 
futures contracts as an investment medium or give advice on trading futures contracts 
or commodity options”.  
 
Managed futures or CTAs follow a set of investment strategies, utilising futures contracts and 
options on a wide variety of goods. They may invest in physical goods like agricultural 
products, forest products, metals and energy, as well as non-commodity related futures like 
financial instruments such as indices, bonds, and currencies (Gregoriou, 2008). With an 
investment strategy involving investments in futures, the hedge funds use leverage to increase 
their amount invested. A CTA is often compensated through management fees and profit 
incentive fees. The management fees are calculated as a percentage of the equity in the fund, 
while the incentive fees are calculated as a percentage of new trading profits. As non-
commodity related futures like currencies, interest rates, and stock indices dominate the 
global markets today, the term CTA might be misleading for new investors (Stefanini, 2006).  
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6.8 Multi-Strategy 
By definition, multi-strategy hedge funds will engage in various investment strategies, 
assumed to increase the diversification. The investment objective of multi-strategy funds is to 
deliver constantly positive returns, regardless of the movement of the equity, the interest rate 
and the currency markets. There are no limitations of which strategies a multi-strategy fund 
can use. Strategies that are normally included are long/short equity and merger arbitrage 
(Stefanini, 2006).  
 
Multi-strategy funds will rarely be the best performing category of hedge funds, over a short-
term time horizon. However, they can offer investors access to a variety of strategies and 
thereby improve the risk-adjusted returns of concentrated investment portfolios (Stefanini, 
2006). 
 
6.9 Fund of Hedge Funds 
Fund of hedge funds strategies, also known as fund of funds, involve creating a portfolio 
consisting of shares in a number of different hedge funds. The underlying hedge funds that 
are chosen vary from fund to fund. Fund of funds may invest in hedge funds using a 
particular management strategy, or invest in hedge funds with a range of strategies. By 
investing in fund of funds, one can increase the diversification and thereby reduce the risk. 
However, as each fund is already diversified, there is a risk that the investor will end up back 
at the market portfolio at substantial cost (Cochrane, 2014). 
 
Investing in fund of hedge funds will gain the investor the access to experienced 
management. Both the portfolio mangers of the fund of funds, using their skills to select 
superior underlying funds, and the different hedge fund managers, will do their best to 
produce alpha. Monitoring several funds is costly and takes time. Fund of hedge funds have 
requirements regarding entering and withdrawing from the fund, but compared to a normal 
hedge fund, their conditions are usually much more flexible than the underlying fund. Fund 
of hedge funds usually contains a double-layer of fees. The 2 and 20 must be paid to the 
hedge funds invested in, in addition to a common 1 and 10 per cent management and 
performance fee to the managers of the fund of hedge funds (Ilmanen, 2012).  
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7.0 Biases in Hedge Fund Databases 
This chapter elaborates on the biases present in hedge fund databases. Several factors 
influence the quality of historical return data from hedge funds. According to Fung & Hsieh 
(2001), three factors cause the biases’ presence in hedge fund return-data. The first factor is 
that hedge funds are organised as private investment vehicles. For this reason, participation in 
hedge fund databases is voluntary. Secondly, the databases have different criteria for 
including hedge funds, implying that the selection of database will have huge impact on the 
perceived return of hedge funds. The third aspect is that most commercial hedge fund 
databases were established as late as in the 1990s.  
 
The following sections will introduce the most common biases present in hedge fund 
databases: Survivorship bias, Backfill bias, Self-selection bias, Infrequent pricing & 
Illiquidity bias, Difficulty of obtaining hedge fund returns, and Database/Sample selection 
bias. 
 
7.1 Survivorship bias  
Survivorship bias appears when funds stop reporting, either when they are under distress or 
have ceased to exist. As a consequence, the database will only contain the funds that are 
operating at the end of the sampling period, the survivors. Usually, funds cease to exist 
because of poor performance. Therefore, the database will show historical returns that are 
biased upwards, and historical risk that is biased downwards (Fung & Hsieh, 2001). 
Survivorship bias can also be a factor for mutual funds in general. Malkiel (1995) finds that 
survivorship bias for mutual funds can be calculated by finding the population of all mutual 
funds that operated during a certain period. Then the average return of all these funds is 
compared to the return of the surviving funds at the end of the period, where the difference 
equals the survivorship bias. Fung & Hsieh (2001) points out that the method of Malkiel 
(1995) is difficult for predicting the survivorship bias, as most hedge fund databases started 
operating in the 1990s. Therefore, funds that ceased to exist pre 1990s are not part of the 
dataset. The difference between funds that simply exited the database (defunct funds) and 
funds that ceased to exist (dead funds) further complicates the estimation of the survivorship 
bias (Fung & Hsieh, 2001). Ang (2013) argues that hedge funds mainly report to databases in 
order to advertise themselves. Funds that produce extraordinary good returns will generally 
not be in need of capital, their returns market themselves, and will not necessarily report 
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return data. Anecdotal evidence on this is provided by Fung & Hsieh (1997) who claims that 
Soros’ Quantum Fund rejected new inflows in the period after 1992. According to Ang 
(2013), hedge fund databases therefore miss both the extreme left- and right-hand tails. In 
general, the returns reported are too good (Ang, 2013). The result of Aiken et al. (2013) 
shows that the difference in risk-adjusted returns between reporting hedge funds and non-
reporting hedge funds is 5.3% in favour of the reporting hedge funds. Malkiel and Saha 
(2005) supports this as they find the difference in returns of reporting hedge funds and hedge 
funds that stop reporting to be 4.4%. 
 
It reasonable to assume that the survivorship bias provides a perception of hedge fund returns 
that is artificially too good.  
 
7.2 Backfill bias 
Backfill bias occurs when hedge funds are provided the option to “backfill” their historical 
returns at the time they enter a database. Lhabitant (1996) argues that this gives the 
possibility for funds to decide when to be included in the database. Given this possibility, 
funds with superior histories are more likely to report them and the aggregated returns will 
look better (Ilmanen, 2012). Several studies have tried to measure the backfill bias. Fung & 
Hsieh (2000) compares an investment in a portfolio of hedge funds starting from the 
inception of each fund to an investment in a portfolio of the same funds, starting from the day 
they entered the TASS database12. The average difference between the two portfolios is 
considered the backfill bias. On average, Fung & Hsieh (2000) suggests that this difference is 
1.4 percentage points a year. Ilmanen (2012) supports Fung & Hsieh (2000), suggesting a 
difference of about 2% – 4% reduction in average hedge fund returns when adjusting for the 
backfill bias. The bias is assumed to be smaller for value-weighted averages as the backfilling 
is more common among small, younger funds.  
 
7.3 Self-selection bias 
The self-selection bias relates to the voluntary reporting of returns to a database. Hedge funds 
are private investment vehicles and they only have to report return data to their investors. 
Different funds will have different incentives to report or not report to database providers. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Lipper Trading Advisor Selection System (TASS) database is a hedge fund database containing over 
7000 actively reporting hedge funds. 
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The returns data in a database will not represent a true random sample of the population of 
hedge funds. Fung & Hsieh (2001) argues that the self-selection bias appears in two different 
forms. First, the funds with good return data and looking for new investors, are more likely to 
report to a database. This effect will skew the database to show better performance. Secondly, 
many hedge funds chose not to participate in a database because they are sufficiently well 
known, or are not looking for more investors. Many of the funds that do not report to the 
databases are among the most successful, skewing the database to show weaker performance. 
Therefore, Ilmanen (2012) argues that the effect of the self-selection bias is ambiguous. 
 
7.4 Mark-to-Market Problems: Infrequent pricing and Illiquidity bias  
Asness et al. (2001) emphasises that hedge fund returns are subject to stale or managed 
prices, lowering estimates of correlation to traditional indices. Hedge funds hold a wide range 
of illiquid and difficult-to-price securities. The inaccessibility of prices for these securities 
provides hedge funds with different possibilities for how they mark their holdings for month-
end reporting. As an example, hedge funds may use either the last available trade, or even 
guesstimates to mark month-end holdings. Asness et al. (2001) further suggests that the 
widespread practice of calculating performance and statistical measures on a monthly basis, 
may provide hedge fund managers with a strong incentive to show monthly returns that are 
uncorrelated with other assets. Asness, the co-founder of AQR Capital, suggests that the best 
way to deal with the mark-to-market problem for hedge fund returns is to use longer time 
horizons. The mark-to-market problem then will be a smaller component of these returns 
(Asness, Krail, & Liew, 2001).  
 
7.5 Difficulty of obtaining hedge fund index returns 
Ang (2013) raises an important warning regarding the challenge of replicating hedge fund 
index returns. There are no cheap and investable index funds that can replicate hedge fund 
returns in a similar way as the equity index funds replicate equity returns. In addition, it will 
not be feasible for an investor to invest in all of the hedge funds included in an index. This is 
due to the fact that hedge funds may be closed for additional investors, the minimum 
investments are high, and even if the hedge fund leaves the index your investment will still be 
locked-up in the fund (Ang, 2013). 
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7.6 Database/Sample Selection bias  
The database selection bias occurs as there are differences between the databases gathering 
hedge fund returns, and as every database is incomplete. The databases have different 
inclusion criteria; some databases may demand a minimum asset base, a certain years of 
existence, or other characteristics. These selection criteria generate a sample selection bias 
towards certain types of hedge funds, e.g. hedge funds with a certain size. It is important to 
be aware of this when using hedge fund return databases, as illustrated by the difference in 
hedge funds returns in figure 8 (Ilmanen, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 8: The figure illustrates the Database/Sample selection bias, showing the contrast of the annual returns of two 
hedge fund indices: the HFR Hedge Fund Index and the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index. Source: Ilmanen (2012). 
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8.0 DATA DESCRIPTION 
In this chapter, we provide a description and justification of the data used in the empirical 
research. As a proxy for the risk-free rate, we have used monthly returns data of 3-month US 
Treasury bills. The risk-free rate was obtained from the US Federal Reserve, and we have 
used an arithmetic average of the monthly risk-free rate in our calculations. The hedge fund 
return data is obtained from Credit Suisse and Hedgenordic. We use indices from MSCI, 
Standard & Poor’s, and the Oslo Stock Exchange as a proxy for equity returns. In order to 
estimate bond returns, we use indices from JPMorgan and Bank of America Merrill Lynch. 
Note that we only use return indices for our calculations, and that the indices are net of all 
fees. Table 2 illustrates monthly descriptive statistics of the indices used in the empirical 
research. 
 
 
Table 2: This table illustrates monthly descriptive statistics of the indices used in the empirical research. The time 
period analysed is Jan 04 – Dec 13. Our calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, 
MSCI, YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, BofA, and JPMorgan. 
 
In the first section of this chapter, we present a description of the period analysed. The 
second and final section provides a justification of the indices used in our empirical research. 
For a full description of the hedge fund indices, and the stock and bond indices used for 
comparison, see appendix A – C.  
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8.1 Description of the period analysed 
In our empirical research, we analyse the period from the beginning of January 2004 to the 
end of December 2013. Figure 9 illustrates how the market has developed, and shows the 
nominal growth of $100 invested in 2004 for some of the indices used in the empirical 
research. 
 
 
Figure 9: The figure illustrates the nominal growth of $100 for the primary indices used in the empirical research for 
the whole time period (January 2004 – December 2013). Our calculations are based on data collected from: Credit 
Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, BofA and JPMorgan. 
 
During the time period analysed, the global stock market was affected by the worst financial 
crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Caprio et al. (2010) have labelled the time 
period between the summer of 2007 and the late spring of 2009 as the “Great Financial 
Crisis”, characterised by unsettled and dysfunctional markets. The “Great Financial Crisis” 
resulted in a total collapse of several large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by 
national governments, and a period of downturns in the stock markets around the world. The 
crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses and a decline in consumer 
wealth. As a consequence of the downturn in the economic activity, the crisis lead to a global 
recession and a European sovereign-debt crisis, which started in 2008 and are still affecting 
the European markets (Caprio, D'Apice, Ferri, & Puopolo, 2010). 
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8.2 Justification of the data 
In order to analyse if hedge funds are an attractive investment opportunity for a Norwegian 
private investor, we use a set of comparable risky assets. In addition to hedge funds, we chose 
to focus the analysis on the core risky assets, which are defined as stocks and bonds (Dispas 
& Govaerts, 2013). We use indices as a proxy for asset class performance; the method used 
by, among others, Sharpe (1992). We chose to work with indices mainly for two reasons: 
First, indices are broad and easy to handle. Secondly, returns data from specific hedge funds 
are not easily accessible. Therefore, as highlighted by Kat & Brooks (2001), a common 
approach is to use hedge fund return indices gathered from renowned hedge fund database 
providers. 
 
The indices chosen are frequently used benchmark indices for the different asset classes. In 
addition to the broad indices covering global investment opportunities, Norwegian indices are 
included for stocks and hedge funds. This is to incorporate the effects of an assumed home 
bias13. For bonds and hedge funds, note that the indices we have used are not investable, a 
private investor can therefore not easily replicate these positions. 
 
8.2.1 Stocks 
The stock indices used in our empirical research is selected to cover the parts of the 
worldwide stock market that would be plausible for a Norwegian private investor to invest in. 
Due to an assumed home bias, the OSEBX is included. The OSEBX is an investable index, 
which comprises the most traded shares, listed on the Norwegian stock market. Further on, 
we use the investable S&P 500 index to provide a representative sample of the 500 leading 
companies within the US economy (SEC, 2014). We included the MSCI World Index as it 
covers the global stock market, and is commonly used as a benchmark for the overall stock 
market performance (Chakrabarti, Huang, Lee, & Jayaraman, 2002). In addition to this, the 
MSCI Emerging Markets, MSCI AC Asia, and MSCI AC Europe are added to the investment 
universe of our private investor in order to broaden the dataset.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Home bias is the investors’ tendency to invest a large amount in domestic equities, despite the alleged 
benefits of diversifying into foreign equities. The bias is believed to be a result of the extra difficulties 
associated with investing in foreign equities (Hens & Bachmann, 2008). 
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8.2.2 Bonds 
The bond indices are chosen based on the principle of covering the parts of the worldwide 
bond market that could be plausible investments for a Norwegian private investor. The 
indices used cover both the government bond market, and the corporate bond market. The 
BofA Merrill Lynch Global Broad Market Bond Index covers investment grade bonds, both 
government and corporate, issued in developed markets. The JPM Global EMBI Composite 
covers government bonds issued in emerging markets, while the BofA US High Yield Master 
II covers the US denominated high yield market. The BofA US High Yield Master II is 
considered an appropriate benchmark for high yield bonds, as the US market is the largest 
high yield bond market in the world (The Economist, 2013). 
 
With regards to the Norwegian bond market, Nordea have recently developed a Norwegian 
bond index, the Nordea Norwegian Bond Index. As this index was developed in 2013, the 
dataset is not sufficient for use in this empirical research (Nordea Markets, 2013). 
 
8.2.3 Hedge Funds 
The hedge fund indices have been chosen with regards to covering most of the hedge fund 
market. The Credit Suisse is considered as a broad global market index for hedge funds 
(Darbyshire & Hampton, 2012). In addition to this, several hedge fund indices from 
Hedgenordic have been included to cover the Nordic hedge fund market. Indices covering the 
different hedge fund strategies have been included, to highlight the performance among the 
hedge funds strategies.  
 
With regards to the upcoming legislation on hedge funds in Norway, one can argue that 
higher regulatory requirements would limit the possible hedge funds available to Norwegian 
private investors, hence weakening the representativeness of the hedge funds indices used in 
our calculations. However, as one aim of the AIFMD is to provide a consistent framework for 
the regulation of hedge funds, we find it reasonable that most of the hedge funds in the 
indices will adapt this regulation. By following the regulations, the hedge funds will be a 
possible investment opportunity for a Norwegian private investor.  
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9.0 SUB-QUESTION I: THE RISK/REWARD RELATIONSHIP OF HEDGE 
FUNDS 
In this chapter, we will explore sub-question I: Do hedge funds provide an attractive 
risk/reward relationship for a private investor? 
 
To elaborate on sub-question I, we will look into three aspects regarding the risk/reward 
relationship of hedge funds: the Sharpe ratio, Key statistics, and the Modified Sharpe ratio. 
 
First, we explore the traditional performance measure of Sharpe (1966), in order to compare 
the risk/reward relationship of standalone investments in hedge funds, bonds, and stocks. 
Secondly, we present some key statistics of hedge fund returns. The calculations of key 
statistics will provide us insights regarding the normality of hedge fund returns in order to 
determine if the assumptions of Tobin (1958) are fulfilled, which could justify the use of the 
mean-variance framework. Further on, the key statistics will provide us with insight 
regarding the skewness and kurtosis of hedge fund returns. The third and final aspect is a 
discussion of the critique regarding the mean-variance framework, and explores how the use 
of a Modified Sharpe ratio will affect the risk-reward characteristics of hedge funds. The 
Modified Sharpe ratio will take into consideration our findings from key statistics regarding 
skewness and kurtosis. 
 
In the first section, 9.1 Findings, we will present the findings regarding the four aspects of 
risk/reward characteristics. In the second and last section, 9.2 Discussion of the findings, we 
will present a discussion of our findings with regards to the attractiveness of the risk/reward 
relationship of hedge funds for a private investor.  
 
9.1 Findings 
In this section, we present the findings from the empirical research with regards to sub-
question I. The first sub-section illustrates the calculated Sharpe ratios, the second sub-
section presents the key statistics, while the third sub-section illustrates the calculated 
Modified Sharpe ratios. 
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9.1.1 Sharpe ratios 
An overview of the Sharpe ratios of the different stocks -, bonds - and hedge funds indices is 
presented in table 3. Table 3 also provides a ranking of the Sharpe ratios calculated for the 
different indices, with the highest Sharpe ratio ranked as 1. In general, hedge funds have the 
highest Sharpe ratios, with the Credit Suisse Global Macro HFX ranked as number 1. Note 
that both the NHX Multi Strategy and the Credit Suisse Multi Strategy hedge funds are top 3. 
The highest ranked bond index, JPM EMBI Global Composite, is ranked as number 5, while 
the highest ranked stock index, OSEBX, is ranked as number 13 with a Sharpe ratio of 
0.1182. The Norwegian hedge fund index, NHX Norway, is ranked as number 8 with a 
Sharpe ratio of 0.1946. 
 
From table 3, it is evident that several of the hedge fund and bond indices provide high 
Sharpe ratios relative to the dataset. In general, the hedge fund and bond indices provide 
higher risk-adjusted returns compared to the stock indices, with some exceptions. 
 
 
Table 3: The table illustrates the Sharpe ratios of the different indices in a ranked order. The time period analysed is 
Jan 04 – Dec 13. Our calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, 
YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, BofA, and JPMorgan. 
	  	  
48	  
 
Figure 10 graphs and groups the different hedge funds, stocks, and bonds with regards to 
their Sharpe ratios. From the figure, it is evident that stocks in general have the lowest Sharpe 
ratios, while hedge funds have high differences depending on the strategies. 
 
 
Figure 10: Sharpe ratios of the different indices. Blue colour indicates hedge fund indices, red indicates stock indices, 
and purple indicates bond indices. The time period analysed is Jan 04 – Dec 13. Our calculations are based on data 
collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, BofA, and JPMorgan. 
 
9.1.2 Key Statistics (Skewness & Kurtosis) 
Table 4, illustrates our calculations of the key statistics for the Credit Suisse and Hedgenordic 
indices. The hedge fund indices exhibit significant negative skewness, including both the 
broad Credit Suisse HF Index and NHX Norway. Our findings exhibit significant positive 
excess kurtosis for the hedge fund indices. The exceptions are Credit Suisse Dedicated Short 
Bias HFX and Credit Suisse Managed Futures HFX, as they do not have positive excess 
kurtosis.  
 
The normality of the returns data is tested using a Jarque-Bera normality test. The Jarque-
Bera test defines a null hypothesis stating that the data is normally distributed, and an 
alternative hypothesis stating that the data is arbitrarily distributed. From a chi-squared 
distribution, the Jarque-Bera test defines a critical value of 5.99 based on a 5% significance 
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level with 2 degrees of freedom. The critical value is exceeded for most of the hedge funds 
indices, indicating that the hedge fund indices are not normally distributed. The exceptions 
are Credit Suisse Dedicated Short Bias HFX, Credit Suisse Managed Futures HFX and NHX 
Multi Strategy where we accept the null hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 4: The table illustrates the summary statistics of monthly returns in the period analysed. Minimum (Min.) and 
maximum (Max.) are based on respectively the lowest and highest monthly returns that occurred during the time 
period. The Jarque-Bera normality test follows the chi-distribution, 𝝌𝟐, with 2 degrees of freedom under the null 
hypothesis, and with 5% significance level and a critical value of 5.99. Accepted null hypothesises are marked with a 
* (Kat & Brooks, 2001). 
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9.1.3 Modified Sharpe ratios 
The effects of implementing the Modified Sharpe ratio adopted from Gregoriou & Gueyie 
(2003) are illustrated in table 5.  
 
 
Table 5: The table illustrates the Modified Sharpe ratios of the different indices, in a ranked order. The far right 
column illustrates rankings based on the Sharpe ratio (SR). The time period analysed is Jan 04 – Dec 13. Our 
calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, 
BofA, and JPMorgan. 
 
From table 5, it its evident that the rankings based on the Modified Sharpe ratios are rather 
similar to the rankings based on the Sharpe ratios. In general, hedge funds perform better than 
stocks and bonds if the Modified Sharpe ratio is used as the performance measure. The most 
significant differences are the improved performance of NHX Norway and the weakened 
performance of JPM EMBI Global Composite. The NHX Norway climbed five places, while 
the JPM EMBI Global Composite dropped six places. 
 
Figure 11 graphs and groups the different hedge funds, stocks, and bonds with regards to 
their Modified Sharpe ratios. 
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Figure 11: Modified Sharpe ratios of the different indices. Blue colour indicates hedge fund indices, red indicates 
stock indices, and purple indicates bond indices. The time period analysed is Jan 04 – Dec 13. Our calculations are 
based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, BofA, and 
JPMorgan. 
 
9.2 Discussion of the findings 
In this section, we will discuss the findings regarding sub-question I of the research question. 
We have divided the findings into three sub-sections: Sharpe ratios, Key statistics, and 
Modified Sharpe ratios.  
 
9.2.1 Sharpe ratios 
The reasoning behind risk-adjusting the returns is to associate a level of risk to the returns 
generated. The Sharpe ratio provides a possibility to rank and evaluate the performance of 
standalone investments. A standalone investment is defined as a single investment, not taking 
into account how the investment would affect the investor’s portfolio.  
 
In general, we observed that hedge funds had higher Sharpe ratios compared to stocks. The 
Hedgenordic indices had five out of seven indices ranked top 9. With regards to a possible 
home bias, it is natural to assume that a Norwegian private investor would invest in Nordic 
hedge funds, supporting that hedge funds could provide an attractive risk/reward relationship. 
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Another observation is that the NHX Managed Futures & CTA and the NHX Funds of Funds 
indices are lower ranked. Ilmanen (2012) argues that funds of funds indices could produce 
more realistic Sharpe ratios, as several of the reporting biases would be reduced. This could 
explain why the observed Sharpe ratio of the NHX Funds of Funds is lower compared to the 
other Hedgenordic indices. Another explanation could be the fact that funds of funds contain 
double layers of fees. As we use net returns data, this would affect the returns and thereby the 
Sharpe ratio of funds of funds. 
 
Liang (1999) and Schneeweis & Martin (2000) support our findings of higher Sharpe ratios 
for hedge funds compared to stocks. Based on his findings, Liang (1999) suggests that hedge 
funds dominate mutual funds, and provide investors with improved risk-adjusted returns. An 
interesting observation is the negative Sharpe ratio of the Credit Suisse Dedicated Short Bias 
HFX, suggesting that the hedge fund index returns are significantly lower than the risk free 
return. Our findings also indicate that during the time-period we investigated, bonds 
produced relatively good Sharpe ratios. This could be due to the recent period of stellar price 
increase in worldwide bond markets. Bill Gross14 argues that we have seen a “three decade 
bull run in bonds” (Wall Street Journal, 2013).  
 
Based solely on the framework of Sharpe (1966), hedge funds would provide a superior 
risk/reward relationship compared to stocks and bonds. With regards to a private investor 
comparing standalone investment opportunities, our findings clearly indicate that hedge funds 
do indeed seem to be an attractive investment opportunity. 
 
9.2.2 Key Statistics 
From the Jarque-Bera test, we found that the hedge fund returns of the Credit Suisse and 
Hedgenordic indices are not normally distributed. As a consequence, none of the assumptions 
of Tobin (1958) for validating the mean-variance framework is satisfied: the returns are not 
normally distributed, and according to Hens & Bachmann (2008) the investor does not hold a 
quadratic utility function. This dismisses the use of a mean-variance framework for 
evaluating hedge funds.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Bill Gross is the co-founder and chief investment officer of PIMCO. PIMCO is among the largest bond 
investors in the world. By 31st of December 2013, they held over $1.9 trillion in assets under management. 
	  	  
53	  
Favre & Signer (2002) criticises the inability to take into account the negative skewness and 
high kurtosis that is present for hedge fund returns data. According to Ilmanen (2012), hedge 
funds returns show significant negative skewness and fat tails. Similarly, our findings suggest 
that there is substantial negative skewness and high kurtosis present with regards to hedge 
fund returns in the period analysed. 
 
According to Harvey & Siddique (2000) and Guidolin & Nicodano (2013), the average 
investor dislikes negative skewness and high kurtosis. As investors care about more than just 
expected returns and variance, one can argue that the Sharpe ratio has clear deficiencies. Kat 
& Brooks (2001) states that the Sharpe ratio is insufficient as performance measure, and that 
the attractive Sharpe ratios of hedge funds could be compared to the fact that there are “no 
free lunches” in finance; investors will pay for the attractive Sharpe ratio with a negative 
skewness and higher kurtosis in the return distribution. In addition to this, Ilmanen (2012) 
argues that many hedge funds load up on various other risk factors that are not well measured 
through the Sharpe ratio. Ilmanen (2012) suggests that alternative betas, illiquidity, lack of 
transparency, and leverage risks are risks that are understated by the evaluation of hedge 
funds based on the Sharpe ratio.  
 
Relying on the logic of Kat & Brooks (2001) and Ilmanen (2012), a private investor will not 
adequately assess the effect on the risk/reward characteristics of hedge funds by using the 
Sharpe ratio: the investor needs to take several other factors, such as the skewness and 
kurtosis, into consideration. 
 
9.2.3 Modified Sharpe ratios 
One performance measure that takes more than just the risk premium and standard deviation 
into consideration is the Modified Sharpe ratio. The Modified Sharpe ratio is based on the 
Modified Value-at-Risk (MVaR), which is used as the denominator instead of the standard 
deviation. According to Gregoriou & Gueyie (2003), the justification for replacing the 
standard deviation by MVaR is that the latter adjusts for skewness and kurtosis. By 
implementing MVaR, the critique from Harvey & Siddique (2000), Kat & Brooks (2001), 
Ilmanen (2012), and Guidolin & Nicodano (2013) is brought to attention.  
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As the Modified Sharpe ratio implements the effect of skewness and kurtosis, we expected a 
substantial change in the rankings of hedge funds when the performance measure was 
changed. However, the findings illustrated differently. From the findings, it is evident that the 
Modified Sharpe ratios do not significantly alter the rankings of the assets. Evaluated by the 
Modified Sharpe ratio, hedge funds remain an attractive standalone investment opportunity 
for private investors. 
 
Even though the Modified Sharpe ratio adjusts for skewness and kurtosis, it may not be 
sufficient to provide an absolute conclusion. Ilmanen (2012) reports on a number of other 
factors distorting the Sharpe ratio as a performance measurement; the illiquidity of hedge 
funds, the leverage risks, and the returns biases. A study done by Ibbotson, Chen, & Zhu 
(2011) found that adjusting for survivorship and backfill bias had an combined impact of 7.2 
percentage points reduction on the annual return of an equally weighted hedge fund portfolio. 
In addition, Kat & Brooks (2001) observed significant autocorrelation15 in their studies of 
hedge fund returns. The observed autocorrelation would systematically lead estimates of the 
standard deviation to be biased downwards, which could explain why we find higher Sharpe 
and Modified Sharpe ratios for the hedge fund indices. As the biases, autocorrelation, and 
other factors are not adjusted for in the Modified Sharpe performance measure, one can argue 
that the adjustments made by going from Sharpe to Modified Sharpe may not be sufficient to 
correctly estimate the risks of investing in hedge funds.  
 
Based solely on the framework of Gregoriou & Gueyie (2003), our findings indicate that 
hedge funds do indeed seem to be an attractive standalone investment opportunity for private 
investors. The change of performance measure from the Sharpe ratio to the Modified Sharpe 
ratio had a lower impact than expected. However, as documented by Ilmanen (2012), several 
other factors that are not adjusted for under the Modified Sharpe ratio may distort the 
evaluation of hedge fund performance. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For theory regarding autocorrelation, see appendix H. 
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Table	  6:	  The table summarises sub-question I: Do hedge funds provide an attractive risk/reward relationship for a 
private investor? 
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10.0 SUB-QUESTION II: THE UNIQUENESS OF HEDGE FUND RETURNS 
From sub-question I of the analysis, we discovered that hedge funds seem attractive, but that 
the performance may be distorted due to biased returns data and insufficient risk measures. 
This chapter directs the attention towards the second sub-question of our research question: 
Are hedge funds providing a unique exposure compared to other asset classes for a private 
investor?  
 
In order to answer sub-question II, we look at three aspects of hedge funds. The first aspect is 
the correlation of hedge funds and traditional assets. The second aspect is an analysis of how 
an efficient frontier consisting of stocks and bonds is affected by including hedge funds to the 
investment universe. The third and final aspect elaborates on the resemblance between hedge 
funds and a short put option. 
 
To analyse the first aspect, the correlation between hedge funds and traditional assets is 
calculated with regards to the whole time period from the beginning of January 2004 to the 
end of December 2013. In addition, we analyse the change in correlations during the “Great 
Financial Crisis”. The analysis of the correlations provides us with important insights 
regarding whether a private investor can obtain similar returns at a lower cost, and whether a 
private investor can improve the risk management opportunities by investing in hedge funds. 
 
The second aspect is an analysis of efficient frontiers based on the framework of Markowitz 
(1952). The findings will provide us with insight regarding how a well-diversified portfolio is 
affected by including hedge funds. If hedge funds improve the efficient frontier, they provide 
a better optimal portfolio for a private investor than what could be obtained from investing 
solely in stocks and bonds, implying unique returns. 
 
Based on our findings regarding the skewness and kurtosis of hedge fund returns, we discuss 
the final aspect by looking into the resemblance between hedge funds and a short put option. 
This will provide us with important insights regarding whether hedge funds provide a cost-
effective way of obtaining returns for a private investor, and whether the hedge fund payoff 
structure is attractive for private investors. 
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We will begin this chapter by presenting relevant literature on the uniqueness of hedge fund 
returns in the first section, 10.1 Relevant academic literature on the uniqueness of hedge fund 
returns. In the second section, 10.2 Findings, we present the findings from our empirical 
research. In the last section, 10.3 Discussion of the findings, we will discuss our findings with 
regards to the uniqueness of hedge fund returns, by elaborating on the correlations, the 
efficient frontiers, and the short put resemblance of hedge funds. 
 
10.1 Relevant academic literature on the uniqueness of hedge fund returns 
There are arguments suggesting hedge funds have the possibility to generate unique returns 
that would be difficult, some would even say impossible, to obtain for other types of funds. 
The way hedge funds trade, dynamically churning securities, employing leverage, and using 
derivatives, provides hedge funds the possibility to emphasise risk factors that are less 
significant in long-only, passive asset allocations (Ang, 2013). Ilmanen (2012) states that the 
restrictions of investor redemptions provide hedge fund managers the ability to extract 
liquidity premiums from the markets. Another argument suggests that the significant 
performance fees and the common structure of hedge fund managers investing in their own 
funds, provides an appropriate alignment of incentives. Ilmanen (2012) found that hedge 
funds where the managers had a significant exposure of their own money lost less than 
traditional money managers during 2007-2008. In addition to the incentive schemes, Jame 
(2013) advocates that hedge funds have the ability to attract the most talented investment 
managers. Other arguments are hedge funds’ ability to enter a variety of different asset 
classes, and the broad and different economic functions they are able to offer. Ilmanen (2012) 
argues that fair rewards could be expected from the economic functions conducted by hedge 
funds, such as capital provision, risk sharing, and market completion.  
 
If hedge funds are able to gain an edge from their flexible structures compared to traditional 
funds, and could be labelled as absolute return funds, it is reasonable to assume that they will 
have low correlation with traditional assets. Fung & Hsieh (1997) are early proponents of the 
low correlations between hedge funds and core asset classes. Liang (1998) supports this view, 
and further attributes the low correlation to the flexible investment strategies of hedge funds 
and the non-traditional asset classes they invest in, such as derivatives. According to Liang 
(1998), hedge funds provide investors with unique returns, stating “the empirical evidence 
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[on hedge fund returns] indicates that hedge funds differ substantially from traditional 
investment vehicles such as mutual funds”. 
 
Ang (2013) contradicts the supposedly low correlations between hedge funds and traditional 
assets. Looking at monthly returns data from January 2000 to September 2012, Ang finds a 
very high correlation between hedge funds and stocks. The findings of Ang (2013) suggest 
high hedge fund returns in the early 2000s, a huge decrease in 2008, and a steady recovery 
after 2009, which is similar to the performance of the equity market. Ang (2013) is supported 
by, among others, Kat & Brooks (2001), as their research indicate a high positive correlation 
between hedge funds and stocks. Kat & Brooks (2001) further documents that different hedge 
fund strategies are highly correlated, even for the strategies that initially seem to have little in 
common, e.g. long/short equity and emerging markets. Their findings imply several common 
systematic risk factors that hedge funds share with stocks. Cochrane (2014) embraces this 
view, stating that hedge funds trade in the exactly same securities as traditional funds, and 
thereby could not be considered a new asset class. Cochrane further points out that in 
addition to trading in common securities, hedge funds on aggregate resembles a common 
security; an option (Cochrane, 2014). This is illustrated in figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12: The figure illustrates the similarity of the payoff structure of hedge funds and short put options. The x-
axis shows the asset price, while the y-axis shows the payoff of the hedge fund. Hedge funds collect steady premiums 
most of the time, but occasionally huge losses occur. Source: (Ang, 2013) 
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Academic literature on hedge funds provides arguments for unique hedge fund returns, 
uncorrelated from other assets, as suggested by Liang (1998). On the other hand, academic 
literature, such as Ang (2013), argue that hedge funds are highly correlated with traditional 
assets, and that the hedge fund returns are nothing but a short put option. This could imply 
that hedge funds do not provide unique returns. The next sections describe our findings with 
regards to the correlation of hedge funds to traditional assets, the effect of hedge funds on an 
efficient frontier consisting of stocks and bonds, and a discussion regarding the resemblance 
between hedge fund returns and a short put option. 
 
10.2 Findings  
In this section, we present the calculated correlations and the efficient frontiers. In the first 
sub-section, we present our findings of the correlations between hedge funds and core assets. 
This sub-section further includes the calculated correlations from the “Great Financial 
Crisis”. As the key statistics indicated non-normality of the data used, the correlations were 
calculated using Spearman’s rank correlation. In the second sub-section, we present our 
calculated efficient frontiers. 
  
10.2.1 Spearman’s rank correlation 
Table 7 illustrates the Spearman’s rank correlations. The findings indicate that stocks are 
highly positively correlated with both the Credit Suisse and Hedgenordic hedge fund indices. 
With regards to the S&P 500, only two out of fifteen observations are significantly different 
from 0. The significant results indicate a lower correlation between S&P 500 and the hedge 
fund indices, compared to the other stock indices. The Credit Suisse Dedicated Short Bias 
HFX has negative correlations with the stock indices.  
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Table 7: The table illustrates the Spearman’s correlation between the hedge fund indices and stock indices. Note that 
* marks insignificant results, tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. The t-test documents whether 
there is correlation significantly different from 0: H0: ρ = 0, HA: ρ ≠ 0.  N=119. The time period analysed is Jan 04 – 
Dec 13. Our calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, YahooFinance, and 
Euroinvestor. 
 
From table 8, we see that the correlations between bonds and hedge funds are mainly 
positive, but compared to the correlations between stocks and hedge funds they are lower. 
Interestingly, the Credit Suisse Global Macro HFX has higher correlation with bonds than the 
Credit Suisse Fixed Income Arbitrage HFX. Bank of America Global High Yield Bond index 
is showing generally insignificant observations with regards to our null hypothesis, and will 
not be further elaborated on. 
 
 
Table 8: The table illustrates the Spearman’s correlation between the hedge fund indices and bond indices. Note that 
* marks insignificant results, tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. The t-test documents whether 
there is correlation significantly different from 0: H0: ρ = 0, HA: ρ ≠ 0. N=119. The time period analysed is Jan 04 – 
Dec 13. Our calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, BofA, and JPMorgan. 
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Table 9 illustrates the effect the “Great Financial Crisis” had on the correlations between 
hedge funds, stocks and bonds. The first period analysed is from the beginning of January 
2004 to the end of December 2013, excluding the “Great Financial Crisis” (illustrated as 
“Excluding the crisis” in table 9). The second period analysed is the “Great Financial Crisis”, 
from the end of June 2007 to the end of June 2009 (illustrated as “2007-2009” in table 9). 
The Credit Suisse hedge fund indices show ambiguous, but slightly lower correlations with 
the MSCI World during the financial crisis. The correlations with OSEBX, on the other hand, 
have increased. The Hedgenordic indices show a significant increase of correlation with the 
MSCI World and the OSEBX during the financial crisis. 
 
As the hedge fund indices’ correlations with BofA Global Broad index are insignificant with 
regards to the null hypothesis, we will not elaborate on these correlations further. 
 
 
Table 9: The table illustrates a comparison of the Spearman’s correlation between hedge fund indices and MSCI 
World, OSEBX, and BofA Global Broad. Two time periods are analysed. The first period is from the beginning of 
January 04 to the end of December 13, excluding the “Great Financial Crisis” (“Excluding the crisis”). The second 
period is the “Great Financial Crisis”, from the end of June 07 to the end of June 09 (“2007-2009”). Note that * 
marks insignificant results, tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. The t-test documents whether 
there is correlation significantly different from 0: H0: ρ = 0, HA: ρ ≠ 0. N1=94 and N2=24 for respectively “Excluding 
the crisis” and “2007-2009”. Our calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, 
Euroinvestor, and BofA. 
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10.2.2 Efficient Frontiers for different asset classes 
A comparison of the efficient frontiers of the stocks-, bonds-, and hedge funds indices can be 
seen in figure 13. For a monthly return of 1%, the standard deviation of stocks is above 4%, 
bonds’ standard deviation is approximately 4%, while hedge funds’ is approximately 1%. 
The efficient frontier of hedge funds lies above and to the left of the other efficient frontiers, 
implying superiority of hedge funds.  
 
 
Figure 13: Minimum variance frontiers for three portfolios consisting of i) hedge fund indices (blue line), ii) stock 
indices (red line), and iii) bond indices (green line). Note that the hedge fund indices are not investable, and the hedge 
fund efficient frontier cannot be obtained for a private investor. The time period analysed is Jan 04 – Dec 13. Our 
calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, 
BofA, and JPMorgan. 
 
By creating efficient frontiers, with and without the possibility to invest in hedge funds, we 
get an indication of whether hedge funds provide unique returns. Figure 14 illustrates the 
efficient frontiers created, where we have included two hedge funds, the NHX Norway and 
the Credit Suisse HFX, to a portfolio consisting of stocks and bonds (see appendix G for an 
efficient frontier where all the hedge fund indices are included). The blue line illustrates the 
efficient frontier without hedge funds, while the red line illustrates the efficient frontier with 
hedge funds. The efficient frontier with hedge funds lies above and to the left of the original 
efficient frontier, implying a lower global minimum variance point, and an improved optimal 
portfolio. 
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Figure 14: Minimum variance frontiers of portfolios with (red line) and without (blue line) the possibility to invest in 
hedge funds. In the portfolio with the possibility to invest in hedge funds, we have included two hedge fund indices in 
the calculations: the NHX Norway and the Credit Suisse HFX. The time period analysed is Jan 04 – Dec 13. Our 
calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, 
BofA, and JPMorgan. 
 
10.3 Discussion of the findings  
In this section we will discuss the findings regarding sub-question II. The discussion is 
divided into three sub-sections. First, there is discussion with regards to correlations. Then, 
there is a discussion on efficient frontiers, while the last sub-section elaborates on hedge 
funds’ resemblance with a short put option strategy. 
 
10.3.1 Correlations 
The key statistics calculated in sub-question I of the analysis indicated that hedge fund 
returns exhibit non-normality. Therefore, the correlations elaborated in this section are based 
on Spearman’s rank correlation.  
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Tables 7 and 8 illustrate our calculated correlations between hedge funds and stocks, and 
hedge funds and bonds. With a correlation below 1, indicating that there is not a perfect 
positive correlation16, there will be diversification benefits from including hedge funds to a 
portfolio of stocks and bonds. Unlike traditional fund managers, hedge fund managers can 
combine long and short positions, and thereby isolate the manager’s security selection and/or 
timing skill from the performance of the underlying asset (Asness, Krail, & Liew, 2001). This 
feature of hedge funds is attractive, as it seemingly could be possible to offer investments 
with high returns, uncorrelated to traditional assets.  
 
Fung & Hsieh (1997), Liang (1998), Agarwal & Naik (1999) and Peskin et al. (2000) all find 
moderate to low correlations between hedge funds and traditional assets. Agarwal & Naik 
(1999) states that the low correlation of hedge funds with traditional assets provide excellent 
diversification opportunities. Based on their findings of the diversification abilities of hedge 
funds, Agarwal & Naik (1999) recommends investors to allocate a significant part of their 
portfolio to hedge funds. 
 
Our findings, however, are more in line with Kat & Brooks (2001), Ilmanen (2012), and Ang 
(2013). They find correlations between hedge funds and stocks to be below 1, but rather high. 
These high correlations suggest that even though there is possible to obtain some 
diversification benefits, the diversification possibilities seem to be substantially lower than 
what is communicated under the slogan of absolute return funds. Interestingly, regardless of 
all the different strategies deployed by hedge fund managers, the aggregate performance of 
hedge funds is tightly related to the traditional stock market. An example supporting this 
argument is the Barron’s top 100 hedge fund awards, documenting the 100 best performing 
hedge funds. According to this year’s list, many of the best performing hedge funds in 2013 
were equity specialists. Indeed, the best performing Glenview Offshore Opportunity Fund 
had two-thirds of its portfolio in 20 long equity positions (Barron’s, 2014). With regards to 
bonds, our findings are coherent with Kat & Brooks (2001), as they find bonds to have 
positive, but lower correlation with hedge funds compared to the correlation between stocks 
and hedge funds. Therefore, a portfolio of hedge funds and bonds would provide better 
diversification possibilities compared to a portfolio of hedge funds and stocks. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 We have not statistically tested if the correlations are significantly different from one. However, we have 
tested for statistical significance of the presence of correlation, and calculated estimates of the correlations. The 
statement is based on our calculated estimates. 
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Fung & Hsieh (1997) advocates that different hedge fund strategies may have converging 
exposure, referring to this as “diversification implosion”. Fung & Hsieh (1997) looks at the 
steady positive trend that was developing in the US bonds market in 1993. During this period, 
Global Macro hedge funds positioned themselves long and leveraged in US bonds. 
Coincidently, Trend Following hedge funds using technical analysis on market prices, 
invested in the same manner. When the bond market declined sharply in 1994, the portfolios 
lost value and moved both Global Macro and Trend Following hedge funds down together. 
This example indicates that diversification possibilities between different hedge fund 
strategies are lower than presumed. Appendix F illustrates our findings of the correlations 
between the different hedge fund indices, which are in accordance with the findings of Fung 
& Hsieh (1997). 
 
The correlations during a period of equity market turmoil are of interest. This is a period, 
when one should expect the uniqueness of hedge funds to justify its fees, by providing low 
correlations and absolute return characteristics. Ang (2013) uses the financial crisis of 2007-
2009 to argue that hedge funds are not absolute return funds. According to Ang (2013), on 
aggregate, hedge funds posted large losses during the financial crisis, and this applied to both 
market timers and non-directional hedge funds. These findings are in line with Ilmanen 
(2012), as he found that for the 12 worst months for equities in the period from 1990 to 2009, 
hedge fund were down in all of them, and vice versa. Our data indicates that both the Credit 
Suisse HFX and NHX Norway posted losses during the financial crisis. Studies suggest that 
not only do hedge funds loose money during poor equity market conditions; hedge funds 
increase their correlation with stocks. Caglayan & Edwards (2001) measured the correlations 
between hedge funds and stocks in the time period from January 1990 to August 1998. Their 
results suggest that during poor equity markets, the correlation between hedge funds and 
stocks increases. Supporting Caglayan & Edwards (2001), Guesmi et al. (2014) finds 
particularly high correlations between hedge funds and equities during recessions. With 
regards to the term “absolute return funds”, the investor wants a steady return and a low 
correlation between stocks and hedge funds during poor equity markets, providing 
diversification to the portfolio. Increasing positive correlation, when the opposite is preferred, 
is not an attractive feature and not strengthening the argument for providing absolute returns. 
Our findings with regards to the correlation between stocks and hedge funds during the 
financial crisis are more ambiguous. The correlations suggest that both the Credit Suisse 
hedge fund indices and the Hedgenordic indices increased their correlation with OSEBX 
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during the “Great Financial Crisis”. In addition, the correlations between the Hedgenordic 
indices and the MSCI World index increased in this time period. However, our results were 
equivocal with regards to the correlation between the Credit Suisse hedge fund indices and 
the MSCI World index. Therefore, our findings are not sufficiently distinct to agree with 
Caglayan & Edwards (2001) and Guesmi et al. (2014) that the correlations between stocks 
and hedge funds increased during the poor equity markets.  
 
According to Asness et al. (2001), the correlation of hedge funds and stocks may even be 
higher than it initially appears to be due to the illiquidity bias. The illiquidity bias illustrates 
how hedge funds intentionally or unintentionally price their securities with a lag. As hedge 
fund managers have a high degree of freedom regarding reporting, the presence of lagged 
prices due to either illiquidity or managed prices can lead to artificially lower estimates of 
volatility and correlation to traditional indices. Asness et al. (2001) finds that the monthly 
correlation estimates greatly understate hedge fund equity market exposure. They document 
that by changing from monthly to quarterly returns data, the correlations will increase.  
 
Due to the high correlation between hedge funds and stocks, hedge funds seem to include a 
significant equity market component. This has two important implications for a private 
investor. First, there are multiple and cheaper ways of obtaining equity market returns. In 
active fund management, a common perception is that true alpha (if it even exists) is the 
active management component that deserves the highest fees, while the rest is paid for by the 
beta (Asness, 2004). Alpha is generally considered as the return from skilful active 
management. Ilmanen (2012) argues that a better definition of alpha is the part of the return 
that cannot be explained by common risk factors. According to Ilmanen (2012), this 
definition illustrates that alpha is defined with respect to a particular asset-pricing model. The 
model decides which factors drive expected returns, and alpha is the intercept or the average 
unexplained component. Ilmanen (2012) further suggests that the latter definition of alpha 
better highlights the process of alphas becoming betas over time. Ilmanen (2012) argues that 
at each step when the alphas become betas, the return factors are incorporated and put 
pressure on the management fees. Well-known systematic factors do not justify high 
performance fees, in contradiction to pure alphas. With lower fees, the investor’s net returns 
will improve as investment costs decrease (Ilmanen, 2012). Given that hedge funds provide 
returns that are seemingly linked to the equity market returns, there are indications of hedge 
funds providing returns that are not entirely unique. If this is the case, the hedge fund 
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managers will have a harder time justifying their fees: the private investor should not pay 
“alpha-fees” for returns generated from systematic factors. By lowering the investment costs, 
private investors would increase their net returns. Relying on this logic, hedge funds seems to 
be an expensive way for the investor to obtain returns generated from systematic risk factors. 
In other words, as the returns from hedge funds are not unique, other investment vehicles 
could be cheaper and better suited for the private investor.  
 
Secondly, the high correlations with stocks indicate that hedge funds may provide less 
attractive risk management opportunities than the name suggests. As both Ilmanen (2012) 
and Ang (2013) demonstrate, hedge funds loose when everything else loose. In other words, 
adding hedge funds to your portfolio of stocks may not drastically reduce your risk. Kat & 
Brooks (2001) further suggests that different hedge fund strategies are highly correlated, 
implying that not only do hedge funds move down with stocks, they also move down 
together. In other words, holding different hedge fund strategies is not an effective way of 
diversifying. This is supported by Cochrane (2014) stating that investors are likely to hold 
several funds to diversify across fund managers with the result of getting back to the market 
portfolio. If you chose this diversifying strategy across hedge funds, you will indeed end up 
with an expensive way of obtaining the market portfolio. In total, adding hedge funds to your 
investment portfolio will likely provide lower risk management opportunities than expected.  
 
Some cautionary notes are worthwhile at this point. We find high correlations between hedge 
funds and stocks, which is coherent with Kat & Brooks (2001), Ilmanen (2012), and Ang 
(2013). But these findings contradict the findings of Fung & Hsieh (1997), Liang (1998), 
Agarwal & Naik (1999) and Peskin et al. (2000). The diverging results can be due to different 
time periods investigated. Correlations change over time, but as Ang (2013) illustrates, hedge 
funds have likely become more correlated with traditional assets over the recent years. A 
further caution is related to the fact that we look at aggregated hedge fund performance. We 
find that the Dedicated Short Bias hedge fund strategy provides low correlations with 
traditional assets, and indeed single funds may provide stellar performance and low 
correlations. However, as our findings illustrates that this is not a common feature of all 
hedge funds, the investor needs to be careful when assessing hedge funds. 
 
The high correlations between hedge funds and traditional assets imply that the 
diversification benefits of hedge funds are lower than expected. In addition, the similarity to 
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equity market returns indicates that hedge fund returns could be obtained more cost-effective.  
Based on our findings of high estimated correlations between hedge funds and stocks, 
supporting the findings of with Kat & Brooks (2001), Ilmanen (2012), and Ang (2013), there 
are indications that hedge funds are not providing unique exposure compared to other assets.  
 
Even though the high correlations between hedge funds and traditional assets may indicate 
lower diversification benefits than expected, the high correlations do not eliminate the 
possibility of some diversification benefits from hedge funds. To further investigate whether 
hedge funds provide unique returns, the next sub-section analysis how the correlations of 
hedge funds affect a well-diversified portfolio by elaborating on the efficient frontiers with 
and without the possibility to invest in hedge funds. 
 
10.3.2 Efficient Frontiers 
From sub-question I, the Sharpe ratios indicated that hedge funds as a standalone investment 
provided attractive risk/reward characteristics for a private investor. By creating efficient 
frontiers with the possibility to invest in hedge funds, one can see if hedge funds provide a 
unique exposure when included in a well-diversified portfolio of stocks and bonds. 
 
In our comparison of the efficient frontiers for the different assets, the efficient frontier of 
hedge funds lies above and to the left of the efficient frontiers of both stocks and bonds. 
Relying on the mean-variance framework of Markowitz (1952), the hedge fund efficient 
frontier offers a higher return for a given level of risk. Our findings are coherent with the 
research of Jaeger (2001), where Jaeger argues that hedge funds have risk/reward 
characteristics superior to traditional asset classes.  A similar result becomes evident if we 
look at a portfolio originally consisting of stocks and bonds, and then add two hedge fund 
indices. Figure 14 illustrates the improvement of the new efficient frontier, which provides 
the investors with investment opportunities at a higher return for a given level of risk. 
 
Several studies support the superior risk/reward characteristics of including hedge funds in a 
portfolio, when using the traditional Markowitz framework. Liang (1999), investigating the 
time period from January 1994 to December 1996, found that hedge funds have an efficient 
frontier above mutual funds. As hedge funds dominated the mutual funds in the research, 
Liang (1999) advocates that hedge funds provide a more efficient investment opportunity for 
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investors. Schneeweis & Martin (2000) looks at the time period from January 1990 to 
December 1998, and supports Liang’s findings. Schneeweis & Martin (2000) used 
Markowitz risk/reward optimisation on a portfolio consisting of 50/50 in stocks and bonds17, 
and studied the effect of adding hedge funds to this portfolio. They found that adding hedge 
funds improved the efficient frontier18 (Schneeweis & Martin, 2000).  
 
Based on our findings, supported by Liang (1999) and Schneeweis & Martin (2000), the 
efficient frontier is improved when hedge funds are included to the investment universe. As 
the efficient frontier is improved, there are two implications for a private investor regarding 
fees and risk management. With calculations based on net returns, the improved efficient 
frontiers imply that a private investor will receive a more efficient investment opportunity 
set, and that hedge funds can justify their high fees. This contradicts our arguments regarding 
the correlations, as we indicated that there were cheaper ways of obtaining the same returns. 
With regards to the second implication, the efficient frontiers suggest improved risk 
management opportunities for a portfolio when including the possibility of investing in hedge 
funds, as the standard deviation decreases for a given level of return. Relying on our 
assertions above, one can argue that hedge funds provide unique exposure compared to 
stocks and bonds as the risk/reward relationship improves. 
 
Even though hedge funds seem to provide unique exposure, the efficient frontiers must be 
considered in light of our findings of the key statistics. The Jarque-Bera test indicated non-
normality of hedge fund returns data, dismissing the assumptions of Tobin (1958). In 
addition, we found that hedge fund returns exhibit negative skewness and positive excess 
kurtosis. With these characteristics, the use of standard deviation as a risk measure is not 
adequate. By implementing MVaR as the risk measurement, Favre & Signer (2002) argues 
that the efficient frontier will move “downwards”, as MVaR adjusts for skewness and 
kurtosis (see figure 15). This implies that our findings of unique returns based on efficient 
frontiers adopted from Markowitz (1952) may be distorted.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 50% was invested in S&P 500, and the other 50% was invested in the Lehman Brothers 
Government/Corporate Bond Index. 
18 In their research paper, Schneeweis & Martin (2000) refer to efficient frontier as the efficiency line. 
	  	  
70	  
 
Figure 15: The figure illustrates the efficient frontiers with and without the consideration of skewness (S) and 
kurtosis (K). As illustrated the efficient frontier moves down and to the right when skewness and kurtosis is adjusted 
for. The efficient frontiers are created from a sample portfolio of stocks and bonds with a maximum of 10% invested 
in hedge funds. The x-axis indicates the normal and modified VaR in %, while the y-axis indicates the historic 
monthly returns. Source: (Favre & Signer, 2002). 
 
Based on our calculations of efficient frontiers relying on the framework of Markowitz 
(1952), there is support of hedge funds providing a unique exposure. However, as our results 
are not adjusted for non-normality, skewness, and kurtosis, our findings may be distorted. 
 
10.3.3 A Short Put? 
The argumentation of Cochrane (2014) regarding the resemblance of hedge funds and short 
put options is proved through the work of Mitchell & Pulvino (2000). Mitchell & Pulvino 
(2000) analyses the risk/reward profile for a sample of risk-arbitrage hedge funds during the 
period 1990 to 1998. They find that the risk-arbitrage returns are positively correlated with 
stocks in downward markets, but uncorrelated with stocks in flat and appreciating markets. 
They further suggest that returns are usually small and steady, but occasional huge losses 
occur. In other words, their findings suggest that returns from risk-arbitrage hedge funds are 
similar to those obtained from selling uncovered index put options (Mitchell & Pulvino, 
2000). The findings of Mitchell & Pulvino (2000) are illustrated in figure 16. 
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Figure 16: The figure illustrates Mitchell & Pulvino’s findings regarding hedge fund returns, resembling short put. 
The x-axis indicates market premiums, and the y-axis indicates the risk-arbitrage strategy premiums. Source: 
(Mitchell & Pulvino, 2000). 
 
The findings of Mitchell & Pulvino (2000) become intuitive by looking at the typical price 
movements during the risk-arbitrage sub-strategy: merger arbitrage. Figure 17 illustrates the 
typical stock price movements of an acquired firm from the merger is announced to the 
merger is completed or fails. 
 
 
Figure 17: The figure illustrates how the price of a stock of the acquired firm usually moves during speculations of a 
merger. If the merger is completed, the investor in the acquired company will earn a small profit. If the merger fails, 
the investor can loose substantially. The x-axis indicates the stock price of the acquired firm, while y-axis indicates 
the evolution of time. Source: (Cochrane, 2014) 
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These findings are coherent with Agarwal & Naik (2000). Although hedge funds can deploy 
all sorts of dynamic trading strategies, a few simple option writing/buying strategies are able 
to explain a significant proportion of the variation in hedge fund returns over time (Agarwal 
& Naik, 2000). Jurek & Stafford (2012) goes further as they show that a simple strategy of 
selling out-of-the money puts accurately matches the risk profile of the hedge fund index and 
actually does it better. 
 
Ilmanen (2012) states that the negative skewness and excess kurtosis of hedge funds indicate 
that they provide misleadingly long periods of solid profits at the expense of some rare 
disastrous losses. The extension of this assertion is that hedge funds have a payoff structure 
similar to a short put option. Our findings from the key statistics in sub-question I of the 
analysis suggest negative skewness and high kurtosis for hedge funds. Therefore, we can 
support the assertion that hedge fund returns on aggregate have characteristics that resembles 
the payoff of a short put option. 
 
There are two important implications of hedge funds equalling short put options. The first 
implication regards the risk attributes of a short put option. Fenghua et al. (2014) states that 
standard financial theory in general assumes some degree of inherent risk aversion, even 
though risk preferences differ among investors and over time. Favre & Signer (2002) points 
out that for a risk-averse investor the high negative skewness is an unattractive feature, as 
there is a higher probability for lower returns. This is supported by Scott & Horvath (1980), 
as they showed that investors would prefer high first and third moments (mean and 
skewness), while they prefer low second and fourth moments (variance and kurtosis). In other 
words, the short put payoff structure may be in contradiction to the most common risk 
preferences of private investors. Note also that losses may be larger for hedge funds than a 
common short put strategy, as hedge funds deploy leverage. Elaborating on the different risk 
preferences of an investor and its implications is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, 
we would like to highlight that a private investor should consider if a short put payoff 
structure is desirable, before investing in hedge funds.  
 
The second implication is related to the costs. The knowledge of the high correlation with the 
equity market and the continuous disclosure of hedge fund return factors may put pressure on 
the costs related to investing in hedge funds. With several similarities between hedge funds 
and a short put option, one can further question the high performance fees. Cochrane (2014) 
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argues that hedge funds are not a new asset class; “they only trade in the stuff you already 
own”. Based on this insight, the idea must be to find the fund manager with superior trading 
skills. The lack of persistence among top hedge fund managers, proved by Malkiel & Saha 
(2005), is a discouraging sign. As Ang (2013) points out, the knowledge of hedge funds’ 
return characteristics shines an ironic light on pension funds that buys volatility protection, 
while they hold hedge funds that provide the exact opposite exposure. If investors are looking 
for a short put payoff structure, Jurek & Stafford (2012) shows that over the period 2006 to 
2012, a short put investment would have returned 10.2% in excess of T-bills, compared to 
6.3% for hedge funds. In other words, hedge funds may be an expensive way of obtaining 
short put returns. 
 
Even though the high correlations to traditional assets, and the high resemblance between the 
payoff structure of hedge funds and short-put options can be problematic, there are definitely 
some attractive attributes of hedge funds present. Ilmanen (2012), Ang (2013), and Cochrane 
(2014) all agree that hedge funds may be earning fair rewards for the various economic 
functions they provide. Ilmanen (2012) highlights these functions to be capital provision, risk 
sharing, liquidity provision, and market completion. Some of the functions and risk premiums 
collected by hedge funds may not be otherwise available for investors. Indeed, Cochrane 
(2014) argues that there are rewards to be made from new “style” risks, and hedge funds may 
provide an organisational form that can be a useful way to access these investments. Ang 
(2013) suggests that the barriers to entry are low for some of the factor strategies employed 
by hedge funds, and that there is room for innovation with regards to how these factor 
premiums are achieved. Ang (2013) states that there are some mutual funds that have 
strategies similar to hedge funds, but with more investor protection, and that some exchange-
traded funds are specialising in factor premiums chased by hedge funds. Ilmanen (2012) 
notes that hedge fund beta investing can be reasonable as it focuses on capturing only the 
alternative betas19, but argues that capturing the betas requires skill in defining them and 
implementing them. By definition, the pure alpha will not be possible to obtain. 
 
Ang (2013) points out that by 2013, there are no large-scale factor portfolios for volatility, 
liquidity or momentum factors that are diversified across asset-classes and sufficiently cheap. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Ilmanen (2012) refers to alternative beta in this context as risk premia, which are available in the financial 
markets beyond the most traditional risk factors stated in, for example, CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor 
model. Ilmanen (2012) refers to value, carry, volatility and mechanical investment rules with regards to merger 
arbitrage and convertible arbitrage as examples of alternative (or hedge fund) betas. 
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Some very large investors have created their own factor portfolios, but this is not possible for 
private investors. Pointed out by Ang (2013), there is a need for a new generation of index-
style factor funds that provide low-cost exposure to the risk factors inherent in hedge funds. 
The best hedge funds will then probably still exist if they can deliver more than the factor 
returns, but the standards for hedge funds performance will be raised. Private investors will 
then be better off if they can access new factor premiums more cheaply.  
 
Based on our findings of significant negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis, there is 
evidence of hedge funds having a payoff structure similar to the payoff structure of a short 
put. Our findings are in accordance with Ilmanen (2012), Ang (2013), and Cochrane (2014), 
and suggest that the returns generated from hedge funds are not unique, but could be obtained 
with lower fees through a short put option strategy. In addition, the payoff structure of hedge 
funds, with steady returns and occasional losses, do not match the preferred payoff structure 
of the common private investor. 
 
 
	  
Table	  10:	  The table summarises sub-question II: Are hedge funds providing a unique exposure compared to other 
asset classes for a private investor? 
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11.0 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this chapter, we will comment on the limitations of our thesis. These limitations will be the 
basis for our proposed further research. 
 
An important underlying assumption in our thesis is the use of historical returns as a proxy 
for expected returns. Elton (1999) points out that this assumption relies on a belief that 
information surprises tend to cancel out during the period of study. However, Elton (1999) 
argues that this belief is misplaced. He documents that even the weak condition that realised 
returns should exceed the risk free rate, in order for realised returns to be a proxy for 
expected returns, can be discarded for long time periods. Other and more precise proxies for 
expected returns could have provided us with more accurate return estimates, e.g. the use of 
asset pricing models. 
 
Note that we have analysed hedge funds on aggregate and that single hedge funds may 
provide other investment characteristics. Every hedge fund is different; an example of this is 
the performance of John Paulson’s hedge fund, Paulson & Co. The fund successfully 
predicted the sub-prime crisis in 2007 and made a fortune from it, which is in stark contrast 
to the overall weak performance of hedge funds during the “Great Financial Crisis” 
(Zuckerman, 2009). Ironically, Paulson & Co lost 50% of its investment capital in a bad 
gamble in 2011 (The Norwegain Financial Daily, 2013). In our analysis, we have only looked 
at the broad picture, not considered the fact that some hedge funds may deliver outstandingly 
good or bad results. However, the aggregated picture with regards to hedge fund performance 
remains a useful reality check for a private investor exploring the possibility of investing in 
hedge funds.  
 
There are several important biases of hedge fund returns that we have not corrected for, 
which may affect our findings. Brown et al (1999) argues that the survivorship bias overstates 
hedge fund returns by 3 % annually, indicating that the performance measures we have used 
exaggerates the risk/reward evaluation of hedge funds. In addition to this, Amin & Kat 
(2003) argues that the survivorship bias creates a downward bias on the standard deviation 
and kurtosis, as well as an upward bias in skewness. Therefore, the fact that we have not 
adjusted for survivorship biases may explain the similarity in the calculated Sharpe and 
Modified Sharpe ratios. The self-selection bias could also affect our results. The best funds 
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may not have any incentives for reporting results, as they are not looking for more investors. 
On the other hand, the worst performing funds do not report results to avoid bad publicity 
(Ilmanen, 2012). The effect of the self-selection bias on our findings is therefore ambiguous.  
 
Our thesis is affected by the difficulty of obtaining hedge fund index returns, see section 7.5. 
There are no cheap and investable index funds that replicate hedge fund returns in a similar 
way as the equity index funds replicate equity returns. As a consequence, a private investor 
would not be able to hold positions in hedge funds similar to the hedge fund indices we have 
used. In relation to this, note that the superiority of hedge funds shown in figure 13 
(illustrating the minimum variance frontiers of hedge funds, stocks, and bonds) may be 
overstated, as the private investor cannot invest in the hedge fund indices.  
 
A further effect that may bias our dataset is the presence of autocorrelation. Autocorrelation 
is present when there is a mathematical similarity between a given time series, and a lagged 
version of the same time series over successive time intervals. According to Kat & Brooks 
(2001), autocorrelation in hedge fund returns may systematically lead the estimated standard 
deviations to be biased downwards. This implies that by not adjusting for autocorrelation, our 
performance measures and efficient frontiers calculated for the hedge fund indices may be 
overstated. 
 
The different indices trying to document the performance of the hedge fund market vary 
substantially among the different database providers. Liang (2000) finds relatively few funds 
in common for the various databases, indicating the presence of a database bias. Among the 
common funds, Liang finds significant differences in reported returns, net asset value, fee 
structures and investment styles (Liang, 2000). Relying on the insights of Liang (2000), it is 
problematic to draw conclusions regarding the whole hedge fund universe based only on two 
hedge fund databases. Increasing the number of hedge fund return databases could have 
provided a more comprehensive analysis of hedge fund returns. 
 
As we saw from the calculated correlations, several results are insignificant with regards to 
our null hypothesis stating that there is no correlation present. With insignificant results, we 
cannot conclude with certainty and this makes the analysis insufficient. Especially the 
analysis of correlations during the “Great Financial Crisis” presented challenges due to 
insignificant results. We could not say anything with regards to the correlations between 
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hedge funds and bonds, and the correlation between the hedge funds and stocks where 
ambiguous. As this is an interesting aspect regarding hedge funds’ claim of being absolute 
return funds, it is a limitation of our thesis and an interesting subject for further research. 
Ideas for further research could be to calculate rolling correlations, use longer time periods 
(quarterly instead of monthly results) or go deeper into the returns of hedge funds during the 
“Great Financial Crisis”. 
 
Another limitation with regards to our calculated correlations is related to the test of the 
statistical significance. Kubinger et al. (2007) argues that confirming the correlation 
coefficient merely to be unequal to zero does not entail much gain of information, unless the 
correlation coefficient is sufficiently large, and this in turn explains a relevant amount of 
variance. Kubinger et al. (2007) suggests that a more practical approach should be taken 
when defining the null hypothesis. Our approach has not been directly in accordance with the 
suggestions from Kubinger et al. (2007), as we have not included a significance test with a 
null hypothesis stating that the correlation coefficient is equal to 1. Such a test would have 
provided us with the possibility to see if the calculated correlations are statistically different 
from 1. By altering the null hypothesis, we could have obtained further insight with regards 
to whether hedge funds are statistically different from stocks and bonds. This could be 
interesting with regards to further research on whether hedge funds are a separate asset class. 
 
Further on, the fact that we only used the Sharpe ratio and the Modified Sharpe ratio as 
performance measures is a limitation. We have not included the Autocorrelation-adjusted 
Sharpe ratio, the Sortino ratio, Omega, or Kappa, which are all interesting performance 
measures for this assignment. Together with the fact that we have scoped the assignment to 
not look into relative performance measures, there are plenty of interesting subjects for 
further research. Examples could be to identify appropriate benchmarks for evaluating hedge 
funds, investigate the ability of hedge funds to generate alphas, or evaluate hedge funds based 
on some of the performance measures mentioned above.  
 
Ang (2013) have discussed how index factor funds will be the future for the world of hedge 
funds. It took 40 years from the academic beginning of cheap equity index funds before it 
was mainstream, but it will not necessarily take the same amount of time for factor hedge 
funds. Further research regarding factor premiums, looking into the possibility of such index 
factor funds could be both innovative and interesting.  
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12.0 CONCLUSION 
A recent Norwegian legislative proposal, likely to become law in 2014, suggests that hedge 
funds should be able to approach non-professional, private investors. In light of this, the 
objective of our thesis is to examine if hedge funds are an attractive investment opportunity 
for a Norwegian private investor. To answer this research question, we defined two sub-
questions regarding the attractiveness of the risk/reward characteristics and the uniqueness of 
the returns of hedge funds. 
 
To answer the first sub-question, the analysis examined three aspects regarding the 
risk/reward relationship of hedge funds: the Sharpe ratio, key statistics and the Modified 
Sharpe ratio. From the Sharpe ratio rankings, we found that hedge funds provide superior 
risk/reward characteristics compared to stocks and bonds. However, the key statistics 
dismissed Tobin’s (1958) assumptions regarding normality of the returns data, indicating that 
a mean-variance framework is not suitable for hedge funds. In addition, the key statistics 
documented significant negative skewness and positive excess kurtosis in hedge fund returns 
data, further diminishing the credibility of the traditional Sharpe ratio as a performance 
measure for hedge funds. To accommodate the shortcomings of the Sharpe ratio, the 
Modified Sharpe ratio was introduced. The performance of hedge funds remained superior to 
traditional assets. However, Ilmanen (2012) points out several effects that may distort the 
performance measuring of hedge funds rather than just the skewness and kurtosis. Therefore, 
the Modified Sharpe ratio may overstate the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds. 
 
To answer the second sub-question, the analysis examined three aspects regarding the unique 
exposure of hedge funds compared to other assets: the correlation between hedge funds and 
traditional asset classes, the efficient frontiers, and the resemblance between the payoff 
structure of a hedge fund and a short put option. With improved efficient frontiers when 
hedge funds are included to the investment universe, hedge funds provide private investors a 
unique exposure. However, these findings may be distorted due to not considering non-
normality, skewness, and kurtosis. The calculated correlations were moderate to high 
between hedge funds and traditional asset classes, which could indicate that hedge funds 
loose when traditional assets loose. Therefore, private investors’ possibility to improve their 
risk management by investing in hedge funds is more limited than originally expected from 
funds labelled as “absolute return funds”. A further insight, with regards to the moderate to 
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high correlation, is the indication of a significant equity component in hedge fund returns 
(Ang, 2013). Relying on the argumentation of Ilmanen (2012), that every time a risk factor 
becomes systematic it puts pressure on the management fees, one can argue that hedge funds 
is an expensive way of obtaining returns that resembles traditional asset returns. This is 
further supported by our findings of high similarity between the payoff structure of hedge 
funds and a short put option. Jurek & Stafford (2012) finds that a strategy of selling put 
options accurately matches the risk profile of hedge funds and provides higher net returns. 
This implies that the payoff structure of hedge funds can be obtained at a lower cost. A 
second implication of the similarities between hedge funds and short put options relies on the 
insights of Favre & Signer (2002); arguing that investors find a payoff structure of small 
gains and occasional huge losses unattractive. This suggests that hedge funds provide an 
unattractive payoff structure for the common private investor. 
 
To conclude on our research question, the analysis regarding the risk/reward relationship of 
hedge funds indicates that hedge funds are an attractive investment opportunity for a 
Norwegian private investor. However, these performance evaluations are inadequate. In 
addition, our analysis indicates that hedge funds do not provide unique exposure compared to 
other assets; hedge funds provide similar returns as traditional assets at higher costs, they 
provide lower risk management exposure than expected, and an unattractive payoff structure 
for a Norwegian private investor. Therefore, hedge funds seem to be an ineffective and 
unattractive investment opportunity for a Norwegian private investor. However, our results 
provide no justification for categorically rejecting investing in hedge funds. 
 
Based on our analysis, our advice for a Norwegian private investor considering hedge funds 
as an investment opportunity is the following: 
- Look beyond traditional performance measures. 
- Do the returns justify the high fees? Your returns should not be possible to obtain at a 
lower cost. 
- Hedge funds are likely to move in accordance with your holdings in stocks and bonds, 
hence not providing absolute returns. 
- Beware that hedge funds provide a reasonable possibility of huge occasional losses.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Hedgenordic – The Nordic Hedge Fund Index 
Hedgenordic is a provider of different Nordic hedge fund indices, and is the only online 
service provider of its kind to feature a combination of Nordic index data and database 
information. According to their own assessment, the majority of the Nordic hedge funds are 
included in the indices. We have downloaded the data directly for the website of Hedgenordic 
(Hedgenordic). 
 
The Nordic Hedge Fund Index (NHX) is an equally weighted hedge fund index. The index is 
based on data reported directly to Hedgenordic by the hedge fund managers. An overview of 
the funds included in the NHX is shown in following figure: 
 
 
Figure A.1: The figure illustrates an overview of the different funds included in the Nordic Hedge 
Fund Index (NHX). Source: (Hedgenordic) 
 
The NHX Index can be divided into several sub-categories, based on strategy or the origin of 
the hedge fund. Together with the NHX Index, we have used the following six sub-indices in 
our empirical research (Hedgenordic): The NHX Norway, the NHX Equities, the NHX Fixed 
Income, the NHX Fund of Funds, the NHX Managed Futures & CTA, and the NHX Multi 
Strategy. An overview of the six sub-indices can be seen in appendix A.1. 
 
Appendix A.1: Database Construction 
The Hedgenordic indices are asset-weighted, and admission to the indices is done 
continuously. In order for funds to be admitted, Hedgenordic requires that full performance 
history net of all fees, reported as either monthly return or net asset value (NAV), are 
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available to the Hedgenordic database. Before a fund can be admitted to the index, the fund 
must supply the latest annual report and the latest version of the offering memorandum, the 
private placement memorandum, or the prospectus to the Hedgenordic staff. New funds will 
not be included prior to the registration, even if there is a qualified track record 
(Hedgenordic, 2011). 
 
Hedgenordic declares that in order to minimise the effect of the survivorship bias and more 
accurately represent the performance of the Nordic hedge fund industry, funds that have been 
in existence and terminated operations prior to the 1st of June 2005, are eligible for inclusion 
in the index calculations. Funds that end their operations and no longer contribute to the 
indices will have their prior performance history maintained (Hedgenordic, 2011). 
 
The NHX Norway is an index consisting of the 33 Norwegian hedge funds that report to 
Hedgenordic: 
 
 
 
The NHX Equities Index consists of Nordic hedge funds with equity strategies: 
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The NHX Fixed Income Index consists of Nordic hedge funds with fixed income strategies: 
 
 
 
 
The NHX Fund of Funds Index consists of Nordic hedge funds with fund of funds strategies: 
 
 
 
 
The NHX Managed Futures & CTA Index consists of Nordic hedge funds with managed 
futures and/or CTA strategies: 
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The NHX Multi Strategy Index consists of Nordic hedge funds with multi strategies: 
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Appendix B: Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index 
The Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index has existed since January 1994. The Index is created by 
using data from the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Database, tracking approximately 9,000 funds. 
The index is calculated and rebalanced on a monthly basis, and reflects performance net of all 
performance fees and expenses (Credit Suisse, 2014). Since 2000, the Credit Suisse indices 
has been run on a real time basis, so there should be little survivorship or backfill bias after 
that point (Ilmanen, 2012). We have obtained the historical data directly from Credit Suisse’s 
web site. 
 
The main index, the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Index, is an asset-weighted fund index which 
only includes funds. Other sub-indices used in our empirical research are: the Credit Suisse 
Long/Short Equity HF Index, the Credit Suisse Fixed Income Arbitrage HF Index, the Credit 
Suisse Global Macro HF Index, the Credit Suisse Dedicated Short Bias HF Index, the Credit 
Suisse Managed Futures HF Index, the Credit Suisse Multi-Strategy HF Index, and the Credit 
Suisse Convertible Arbitrage HF Index. 
 
Appendix B.1: Database Construction 
The Credit Suisse Hedge Fund indices’ defined universe is funds with a minimum of US$ 50 
million assets under management (AUM), a minimum one-year track record, and current 
audited statements. The index will in all cases represent at least 85% of the AUM in each 
respective category of the index universe. The index is an asset-weighted index, where the 
funds within the index are separated into ten primary subcategories based on their investment 
strategy. The methodology analyses the percentage of assets invested in each subcategory and 
selects funds for the index based on those percentages, matching the shape of the index to the 
shape of the universe. Funds are reselected on a quarterly basis. To minimise the survivorship 
bias, funds are not removed from the index until they are fully liquidated or fail to meet the 
financial reporting requirements (Credit Suisse, 2014). 
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Appendix C: Indices for Comparison 
We have used different stock and bond indices in our empirical research. In this section, we 
will briefly present them. 
 
C.1 Stock Indices 
We have used the following stock indices in our empirical research: 
 
C.1.1 The Morgan Stanley Capital Indices 
The Morgan Stanley Capital Indices (MSCI) is a US-based provider of several equity and 
fixed income indices. We have downloaded data and used the following four indices from the 
MSCI website: 
 
i) The MSCI World Index 
The MSCI World Index captures large and mid cap equities across 23 developed markets. 
With 1,609 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted 
market capitalisation in each country (MSCI, 2014). 
 
ii) The MSCI AC Asia Index 
The MSCI AC (All Country) Asia Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalisation 
weighted index that is designed to measure the equity market performance in Asia. The 
MSCI AC Asia Index consists of the following 11 developed and emerging market country 
indices: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand (MSCI, 2013). 
 
iii) The MSCI AC Europe Index 
The MSCI AC Europe Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalisation weighted index that 
is designed to measure the equity performance of the developed markets in Europe. The 
MSCI AC Europe Index consist of the following 15 developed market indices: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (MSCI, 2013). 
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iv) The MSCI Emerging Markets Index 
The MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalisation index 
that is designed to measure equity market performance of emerging markets. The EM Index 
consists of the following 21 emerging market country indices: Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey 
(MSCI, 2013). 
 
C.1.2 Standard & Poor’s 500 
The Standard & Poor’s 500, known as the S&P 500, is a stock market index based on the 
market capitalisation of the 500 leading companies, capturing approximately 80% of 
available market capitalisation in the US. The S&P 500 components and their weightings are 
determined by S&P Dow Jones Indices. It is one of the most commonly followed equity 
indices, and is by many considered to be the best representation of the US stock market (S&P 
Dow Jones Indices, 2014). The data of S&P 500 was acquired from Yahoo Finance. 
 
C.1.3 The Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index 
The Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) is a total return index that functions as 
an indicator of the overall performance of the Oslo Stock Exchange. The OSEBX is based on 
a representative sample of all listed shares on the Oslo Stock Exchange (oslobors.no, 2014). 
We downloaded the data of OSEBX online from Euroinvestor’s web site. 
 
C.2 Bond Indices 
The bond indices we have used include corporate bonds and government bonds at investment 
grade level, as well as high yield bonds. We have focused on the following bond indices: 
C.2.1 BofA Merrill Lynch Global Broad Market Bond Index 
The BofA Merrill Lynch Global Broad Market Bond Index is considered a broad index 
covering the investment grade20 bond market of the developed economies. The index tracks 
the performance of investment grade debt publicly issued in the major US and Eurobond 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Investment grade bonds are bonds rated BBB- or higher by Standard & Poor’s or Baa3 or higher by Moody’s. 
Investment grade bonds are assumingly safer than lower rated bonds, but provide lower yields. Debt rated below 
investment grade is called high yield or junk debt. This debt is riskier, but provide higher yields.  
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markets. The index includes sovereign, quasi-government, corporate, securitised, and 
collateralised fixed income securities (Merrill Lynch, 2001). 
 
C.2.2 JPM Global EMBI Composite  
The JPM Global EMBI Composite is a bond index maintained by JPMorgan, covering the 
total return performance of government bonds issued by selected emerging market 
economies. The index includes sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars, and is weighted 
in accordance with market capitalisation. The largest weights have historically been 
attributed to debt issued by Mexico, Russia and Brazil (Financial Times, 2010). Fabozzi & 
Pilarinu (2002) states that the JPM EMBI Global is the appropriate benchmark for an 
emerging market bond portfolio.  
 
C.2.3 BofA US High Yield Master II 
The BofA US High Yield Master II tracks the performance of US dollar denominated 
corporate debt publicly issued in the US domestic market. The debt included is rated below 
investment grade, based on an average rating from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. Index 
constituents are capitalisation-weighted based on their amount outstanding. As the US dollar 
denominated corporate debt market is the largest in the world, the BofA US High Yield 
Master II is considered a good benchmark for the high yield bond market (Federal Research 
Bank of St.Louis, 2009). 
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Appendix D: Statistical properties of selected indices 
In the following graphs, we have plotted some key indices to illustrate their distributions. “# 
Observations” indicate the number of observations observed, while “Return (Monthly)” is 
categories indicating the monthly return observed.  
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Appendix E: Findings: The Pearson’s Correlation  
Appendix E consist of the Pearson’s correlation calculations: 
 
Table E-1: The table illustrates the Pearson’s correlation between the hedge fund indices and stock 
indices. Note that * marks insignificant results, tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance 
level. The t-test documents whether there is correlation significantly different from 0: H0: ρ = 0, HA: ρ 
≠ 0. N=119. Source: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, YahooFinance, and Euroinvestor. 
 
 
Table E-2: The table illustrates the Pearson’s correlation between the hedge fund indices and bond 
indices. Note that * marks insignificant results, tested with a two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance 
level. The t-test documents whether there is correlation significantly different from 0: H0: ρ = 0, HA: ρ 
≠ 0. N=119. Source: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, BofA and JPMorgan 
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Table E-3: The table illustrates a comparison of the Pearson’s correlation between hedge fund 
indices and MSCI World, OSEBX, and BofA Global Broad. Two time periods are analysed. The first 
period is from the beginning of January 04 to the end of December 13, excluding the “Great Financial 
Crisis” (“Excluding the crisis”). The second period is the “Great Financial Crisis”, from the end of 
June 07 to the end of June 09 (“2007-2009”). Note that * marks insignificant results, tested with a 
two-tailed t-test, at a 5% significance level. The t-test documents whether there is correlation 
significantly different from 0: H0: ρ = 0, HA: ρ ≠ 0. N1=94 and N2=24 for respectively “Excluding the 
crisis” and “2007-2009”. Our calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, 
Hedgenordic, MSCI, Euroinvestor, and BofA. 
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Correlation matrix from the whole time period analysed: 
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Correlation matrix with the whole time period analysed, excluding the “Great Financial 
Crisis”: 
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Correlation matrix during the “Great Financial Crisis”: 
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Appendix F: Findings: The Spearman’s Correlation  
Correlation matrix from the whole time period analysed: 
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Correlation matrix for the whole time period analysed, excluding the “Great Financial 
Crisis”: 
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Correlation matrix during the “Great Financial Crisis”: 
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Appendix G: Efficient frontiers with and without HFs – including all HFs 
By creating efficient frontiers, with and without the possibility to invest in hedge funds, we 
get an indication of whether or not the hedge funds will have a positive effect on the 
risk/reward relationship of a private investor’s portfolio. Figure G-1 illustrates the efficient 
frontiers created, where we have included all the hedge funds indices to a portfolio consisting 
of stocks and bonds. The blue line illustrates the efficient frontier without hedge funds, while 
the red line illustrates the efficient frontier with hedge funds. 
 
Figure G-1: Minimum variance frontiers of portfolios with (red line) and without (blue line) the 
possibility to invest in hedge funds. In the portfolio with the possibility to invest in hedge funds, we 
have included all the hedge fund indices in the calculations. The time period analysed is Jan 04 – Dec 
13. Our calculations are based on data collected from: Credit Suisse, Hedgenordic, MSCI, 
YahooFinance, Euroinvestor, BofA, and JPMorgan. 
 
Figure G-2 illustrates efficient frontiers created solely from the different hedge fund strategy 
indices from Credit Suisse and Hedgenordic (NHX). The NHX efficient frontier has a lower 
global minimum variance point, whereas the Credit Suisse efficient frontier is steeper. This 
indicates that one could be able to achieve a higher Sharpe ratio investing in a portfolio 
consisting of Credit Suisse hedge funds indices. However, if the investor’s main objective is 
to minimise risk (standard deviation), the NHX hedge fund indices is preferred. 
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Figure G-2: Minimum variance frontiers for the hedge fund indices of NHX (purple line) and Credit 
Suisse (turquoise line). The time period analysed is Jan 04 – Dec 13. Our calculations are based on 
data collected from: Credit Suisse and Hedgenordic. 
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Appendix H: Theory: Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation is present when there is a mathematical similarity between a given time 
series and a lagged version of the same time series over successive time intervals. As 
autocorrelation compares the correlation of variables with itself over time, autocorrelation is 
also usually referred to as serial correlation or lagged correlation. As for other correlation 
coefficients, the autocorrelation coefficient can range from perfect negative correlation (-1) to 
perfect positive correlation (+1). If the autocorrelation is perfectly positive, an increase in one 
time series will lead to a similar increase in the other time series. If the autocorrelation is 
perfectly negative, an increase in one time series will lead to a proportionate decrease in the 
other time series. The presence of significant autocorrelation in a time series implies 
predictability of future values, as they will be correlated (Rachev, Hoechstoetter, Focardi, & 
Fabozzi, 2010). 
 
